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Summary 
This thesis examines how the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that India is 
currently negotiating with the European Union (IndEUFTA) may impede 
the production of Indian generic version of HIV/AIDS medicines and 
thereby hinder access to HIV/AIDS medicines. The reason for discussing 
specifically HIV medicines in the context of Indian generic manufacture is 
important in two ways. First, considering the disasters that HIV pandemic 
brought while at the same time there are huge cuts in the budget of the 
major international donors providing access to HIV treatments. Second, 
Indian generic companies have been contributing their immense role in 
facilitating access to particularly HIV medicines. The aim is also to show 
that access to medicines, though subject to some debate, can be claimed as a 
human right under the umbrella of the right to health and that the 
IndEUFTA may infringe this right.  
The thesis starts with the discussion of approaching access to 
medicines as a human right under the auspices of the right to health. Then 
the thesis offers the reader the important role and contribution Indian 
generic manufacturers have been providing in relation to access to 
HIV/AIDS medicines by offering low cost good quality generic version of 
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). This will help the reader to realize the 
seriousness of the problem at stake if the Indian generic companies are 
hindered. Indian pharmaceutical industry has been able to accomplish its 
advanced generic institutions mainly because from 1970 to 2005 India did 
not grant patent protection for medicines. This is further explained in detail 
by looking at the history of Indian pharmaceutical industry.  
However, in 2005 India started complying with the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and thus was 
obliged to introduce patent protection for medicines. The introduction of 
patent rights over pharmaceuticals blocked the production of generics in 
general and generic version of ARVs in particular to certain extent. The 
thesis explains how India managed to avoid total obstruction of its generic 
production by using so called “TRIPS flexibilities”. More importantly for 
the purpose of this study, the IndEUFTA that India has been negotiating 
with the EU may bring further hurdle for already constrained Indian generic 
industry since it contains some provisions which seek even more stringent 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) than TRIPS. This thesis 
analyzes strict provisions contained in the IndEUFTA that have been subject 
to the most of the debates and that may have far reaching impact. Those 
provisions include data exclusivity, extensions of patent protection term, 
stringent enforcement of IPRs, and broad scope of investment protection.  
The thesis also looks at the experience of other developing countries 
that entered into FTAs with similar provisions in order to see the impact that 
those developing countries had on their pharmaceutical industry, 
particularly in relation to prices of and access to medicines. This will enable 
to see the real possible effects that the pharmaceutical industry of India may 
have if such provisions are included in the IndEUFTA. For this purpose, the 
FTAs that Jordan, Colombia, Peru and Thailand each concluded with the 
United States of America (U.S.) are discussed.   
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The IndEUFTA is still under negotiation and there is no clear cut 
answer as to whether stringent provisions discussed in this thesis will be 
included in the agreement. However, even assuming that India may not 
agree for any conditions of the IndEUFTA that may affect its generic 
production, this study does not lose its value since there are some other even 
stronger proponents of stricter patent laws, for example like the U.S., that 
are intending to have an FTA with India. In this sense, this study remains to 
be helpful so as to aware about the possible implications to access to 
medicines from FTAs that seek for more rigorous patent protection that 
India may encounter in the future.    
 
Keywords: access to medicines, free trade agreement, HIV/AIDS, Indian 
generics, patent tights, stringent IPRs.    
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Abbreviations  
AIDS Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
ARV Antiretroviral drug 
ColUSFTA Columbia-US free trade agreement 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign direct investment  
FTA Free trade agreement 
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus 
IndEUFTA India-EU free trade agreement 
IP  Intellectual property 
IPO Indian Patent Office 
IPRs Intellectual property rights 
JorUSFTA Jordan-US free trade agreement 
LDC Least Developed Countries 
PerUSFTA Peru-US free trade agreement 
ThaiUSFTA Thailand-US  free trade agreement 
TRIPS Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 
U.S. United States of America 
USD United States dollar 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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1 Introduction 
“Healing is a matter of time, but it is  
sometimes also a matter of opportunity” 
                      Hippocrates 
1.1 Background 
Nobody could expect that several a rare-skin disease, known as Kaprosi’s 
sarcoma, that were met in young gay men in New York in 1981 was the 
start of HIV/AIDS pandemic.
1
 Reaching these days there are more than 34 
million people currently living with HIV out of which 3.4 million are 
children under age of 15. Each year at minimum 2 million get the infection 
while almost similar amount of people die from HIV. For example in 2011 
itself 2.5 million people were infected with the disease while 1.7 million 
people, including 230,000 children being under 15, died in the same year as 
a result of it. In total the pandemic has taken the souls of 30 million people, 
almost twice more than the total human death in the World War I, since its 
start.
2
 However, one factor for optimism is that the number of newly 
infected people has fallen to 21% coming to these days comparing to 1997. 
One of the main factors for such decline is the increase in the availability of 
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs)
34
. The number of people in low and middle 
income countries getting HIV treatment has grown from 300,000 in 2002 to 
more than 6,6 million coming to the end of 2010.
5
  
The increase in the availability of ARVs was primarily caused by the 
global price decrease of ARVs which has taken place owing to the 
production and provision of low cost good quality generic
6
 version of ARVs 
                                                             
1 Hestermeyer H. P., (2004) Access to Medications as a Human Right. Max Planck UNYB 
8, p. 103. Last accessed on 19 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/hestermeyer_8.pdf 
2 amfAR., (2012) Statistics: Worldwide [online]. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, 
available at: 
http://www.amfar.org/About_HIV_and_AIDS/Facts_and_Stats/Statistics__Worldwide/   
3 UNAIDS., (2010) 2010 Global Report [online], p.16. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, 
available at: http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_globalreport_chap2_em.pdf  
4 ARVs are medications used for the treatment of HIV. The ARVs do not fully cure the 
disease but it is essential to keep the level of the virus in the body low and thereby prolong 
lives and decrease suffering. See, Avert, (2012) Introduction to HIV and AIDS Drug 
Treatment [online]. Last accessed 16 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.avert.org/treatment.htm#top 
5 UNAIDS, (2012) The Potential Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Public Health 
[online], p. 2. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2012/J
C2349_Issue_Brief_Free-Trade-Agreements_en.pdf.   
6 At this stage it is already necessary to understand what a generic medicine means. Usually 
when a new drug is created, it is further developed, distributed and sold under patent 
protection and only the patent owner has a right to do this. However, based on several 
conditions, for example when patent expires, it is possible to copy the branded medicine 
and produce similar medicine (known as generic version) without investing to a research 
and development. Therefore, generic version of medicines is comparatively and usually 
considerably cheaper than branded version. A generic medicine is similar to a brand name 
in “dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance 
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by Indian generic companies. In 2001 HIV treatment using patented version 
of ARVs cost patients USD 10,439 per year and with the introduction of 
Indian generic version of ARVs the price dropped to USD 350 per annum 
(i.e. almost 30 times drop) in the same year. At the same time, 80% of 
ARVs bought by low and middle income countries originate from India 
making it truly be ‘the pharmacy of developing world’. Indian local 
pharmaceutical companies were able to achieve these results primarily 
because India from 1970 until it implemented TRIPS in 2005 did not 
recognize patent protection over pharmaceutical products. The absence of 
patent protection over pharmaceuticals resulted in the foundation of 
numerous generics based pharmaceutical companies and the escalation of 
generic production. Even after starting to grant patent protection to 
medicines from 2005, India was able to some extent retain its local generic 
production using some particular legislative and policy options towards 
patent rights. However, for the last five years India has been negotiating a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU)
7
 and some 
provisions of the FTA proposed by the EU may have some significant 
impact to Indian pharmaceutical patenting and by this to production of 
Indian HIV generics. Such provisions include the extension of patent 
protection term, data exclusivity, stringent enforcement of patent rights, and 
broad scope of investment protection.  
1.2 Research question  
The main research question of this paper which I intend to answer is: 
 ‘What legislative changes the Free Trade Agreement between 
European Union and India may bring to India’s patent law and how such 
changes may hinder India’s generic production and thereby access to AIDS 
medicines?’  
I think bearing in mind the vital importance of life saving AIDS 
generic medicines produced by India that are creating an access huge 
number of people, especially the poor, it is important to study this question 
and to be aware of the results that it brings. The conclusion of the FTA has 
been much delayed than originally planned and both parties intend to finally 
adopt it by the end 2012. There are several factors causing such delay 
including rigorous negotiations in the field of IPRs. The EU has been 
pushing hard to include stronger rules in relation to IPRs, which are 
discussed later in this thesis, while India has been resisting. Even assuming 
that India may not agree for some or even any conditions of the FTA that 
may affect its generic production and which are discussed in this thesis, this 
study does not lose its value since there are other FTAs that India may face 
in the future with even stronger proponents of stricter patent laws like, for 
example, the U.S.. Therefore, this study retains its merit so as to aware 
about the possible implications to access to medicines created by the FTAs 
seeking for stronger patent protection, if they especially concern India. 
                                                                                                                                                           
characteristics and intended use”. See, FDA, (2009) What Are Generic Drugs? [online]. 
Last accessed on 27 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Und
erstandingGenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm 
7 In later discussions the FTA between India and the EU is referred as IndEUFTA. 
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1.3 Objective and methodology  
Basically, the purpose of the whole thesis is to show how the role of Indian 
generic manufacturers as facilitator of access to HIV/AIDS medicines 
through its production of generics is being jeopardized through IndEUFTA 
and what consequences it might bring to access to HIV medicines. The 
importance of Indian generic manufacturers is introduced and discussed to 
expose and highlight the critical important role that Indian generic 
manufacturers and Indian pharmaceutical industry in general have been 
playing in facilitating access to HIV/AIDS medicines through its production 
and provision of generics both in national and international levels. These 
HIV generics has so far prevented new infections and at the same time 
prolonged the lives of millions affected by the disease. This has been true 
especially for those who are not able to afford patented version of the 
medicines. The thesis also presents a reader the background of Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. By this it is aimed from to demonstrate how India 
was able to achieve such sophisticated and highly advanced pharmaceutical 
industry while still being amounted as “third world country” whereas its 
other alike partner countries have not attained such progress. In these 
discussions it is also intended to show how India’s production of low cost 
high quality generics have been already affected due to ratchet up patent 
laws, mainly since the implementation of TRIPS in 2005. Then the thesis 
turns the attention of the reader to the main objective of the paper which is 
to analyze possible changes to Indian patent system from the FTA and its 
further negative effects on Indian HIV/AIDS generics production and 
consequent access to such generics. I will involve some empirical analysis 
through discussing the impacts that some developing countries had to their 
pharmaceutical sectors and access to medicines within their borders as a 
result of their free trade agreements. This exercise is done so as to draw 
some relevant conclusions from the actual experience of other countries for 
the case of the IndEUFTA. Although the EU has signed FTAs with a 
number of developing countries, there are no studies available about what 
consequences in regards to medicines those FTAs brought to those 
developing countries. On the other hand, there were some comprehensive 
studies done in relation to implications on access to medicines and 
pharmaceutical sector as a whole from the FTAs that Jordan, Colombia, 
Peru and Thailand each signed with the U.S.. The fact that these FTAs 
contain provisions similar to those contained in the IndEUFTA allows using 
them as a precedent case for India to demonstrate its possible condition after 
the conclusion of its FTA with the EU.   
In answering my research question my sources will mainly derive 
from scholarly articles, reports of international organizations and NGOs, 
interviews and letters of communication with policy makers and other 
interested groups like pharmaceutical companies.  
1.4 Structure  
Chapter 1 offers general background of the situation. In particular, it shows 
the horrifying situation of HIV/AIDS pandemic and briefly describes the 
role of Indian generic medicines in the fight against the pandemic. Chapter 2 
analyzes access to medicines from human rights perspective. In particular, 
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right to health, internationally recognized fundamental human rights, will be 
used as the right overarching access to medicines. The aim from this 
exercise is to show that there can be some strong claims against the 
impediment for the production of Indian generic for the treatment of HIV. 
Chapter 3 will present the importance of India’s pharmaceutical industry for 
the purpose mentioned in the previous section. Chapter 4 will study India’s 
pharmaceutical industry for the reason mentioned in the previous section. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the IndEUFTA in detail. The discussion starts with 
general background of the IndEUFTA and the main motives for having it 
(sub-chapter 5.1). By this it will discuss the main benefits sought by each 
party from having such agreement which will help the reader to understand 
the reason why India got involved into such agreement even at the possible 
risk of its generics production. Then in sub-chapter 5.2 the thesis turns its 
focus to the legislative changes that IndEUFTA may bring to patent system 
of India and how each change may affect generic production and by this to 
access to HIV/AIDS medicines. In sub-chapter 5.3 it is intended to use 
empirical study by looking into already existing FTAs between the U.S and 
afore mentioned countries for the reasons mentioned in the prior section. In 
the final part of the Chapter 5, I will discuss what conclusions in terms of 
India’s generic production and access to HIV medicines can be made from 
all made analysis and other studies in relation to the IndEUFTA. Finally, in 
Chapter 6 I end up with certain conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 Defining Access to Medicines - 
Human Rights Approach 
First of all it is necessary to point that there is no explicit right as right to 
access to medicines. Therefore, in order to approach the access to medicines 
from human rights perspective it is necessary to address to the right to 
health as an overarching right. The right to health is both explicitly and 
implicitly recognized in several international and regional human rights 
instruments.
8
 However, this study will examine right to health as it is 
enshrined in the ICESCR for two basic reasons. Firstly, considering 
recognized international solid status of the document as an international 
human rights document
9
 and secondly considering the comprehensive 
interpretation that the document so far achieved
10
. Right to health is 
formulated in Article 12 of the ICESCR which specifically reads as 
following:  
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:  
… 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases;  
                                                             
8 Health is seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in its Article 25, as a 
part of the right to an adequate standard of living. Even more, the right to health is 
explicitly recognized as a human right in Article 12 of International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966). Moreover, right to ‘the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health’ is regarded in the Constitution Preamble of 
World Health Organization (WHO) as ‘one of the fundamental rights of every human 
being’. The right to health is also accepted as a human right in a number of regional human 
right treaties such as European Social Charter (1961), African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981), and Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Protocol of San Salvador) 
(1988).  
9 For the time being 160 countries, which represents 83% of the world, ratified and 
recognized the rights enshrines in the Covenant as human rights. See, United Nations 
Treaty Collections at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&src=TREATY Last accessed on: 
10 A treaty body, namely the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), is appointed to monitor the implementation of the ICESCR. The body is 
comprised from the group of independent experts that so far issued 21 General Comments 
which in detail interprets 17 different rights, including right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, enshrined in the Covenant and clarifies other subject matters. Although 
General Comments issued by UN treaty bodies do not have binding force upon Member 
States, many commentators believe that they have ‘considerable legal weight’. They argue 
that treaty bodies are the most authoritative interpreter of the covenants in subject and thus 
Member States cannot simply ignore their interpretations even if they do not agree with 
such interpretations. Some commentators even suggest that General Comments are 
‘authoritative interpretations’. Moreover, General Comments can also serve as a tool to 
create customary international law by facilitating formation of opinion juris and state 
practice. See, Mechlem K., “Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights”, 42 
Vand. J. Transnatl L., Vol. 42, no. 905 (2009), pp. 929-930.         
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(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.” 
Some implications in relation to medicines can be drawn from the list of 
steps that the article demands from Member States to take for the realization 
of the right to health. In particular, Article 12 (2) (c) and 12 (2) (d) demand 
from a State “[t]he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases” and “[t]he creation of conditions which 
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness”. The accomplishment of these tasks obviously points to the 
necessity and importance of access to medicines. However, the language 
used in the article is not clear enough to give guidance as to the specific 
entitlements that the right to health confers to individuals as well as no 
specification as to the scope of states’ obligations under the right. Taking 
into consideration such vagueness and the need for interpretation of the 
article, the CESCR adopted General Comment No. 14
11
 directed to the 
clarification of the article.  
The General Comment 14, on the other hand, in detail explains the 
scope and meaning of the right to health. The CESCR interprets the right to 
health as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate 
health care, but also to “the underlying determinants of health”.12 By 
underlying determinants of heath the CESCR enlist detriments such as “safe 
and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities … and 
essential drugs
13
, as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs” (emphasis added). Moreover, the CESCR mentions that there are 
four “interrelated and essential elements” of right to health, namely 
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. These four elements, as 
defined by the CESCR, relate to (i.e. availability, accessibility, 
acceptability, and quality of) health facilities, goods and services plus the 
underlying determinants of health. So in this sense, the essential drugs must, 
first, be “available in sufficient quantity within the State party”. Second, the 
essential drugs “have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination” at 
the same time to be physically and economically accessible. Third, the 
essential drugs “must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally 
appropriate” and fourthly, they must be “scientifically and medically 
appropriate and of good quality”. 14 Among these four elements, the 
economic accessibility of essential drugs requires more attention for the 
purpose of this study. In defining economic accessibility CESCR stated that:  
                                                             
11 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14 on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health, 11 August 2000, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11 
12 Ibid, para. 4. 
13 By essential drugs it refers to, as defined and listed by WHO, ‘medicines that satisfy the 
priority health care needs of a population’. The list of such medicines is created by WHO 
considering ‘disease prevalence, evidence of efficacy, safety, and comparative cost-
effectiveness’. See, WHO, (2010) Medicines: Essential Medicines [online], fact sheet 
no.325. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs325/en/index.html  
14 See, para. 12 of the General Comment.  
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“health facilities, goods and services15 must be affordable for all. Payment for 
health-care services, as well as services related to the underlying 
determinants of health, has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring 
that these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for 
all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer 
households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses 
as compared to richer households;” (emphasis added)
16
 
In this sense, Member States, India in our case, should make sure that 
essential drugs are economically accessible and that poorer people are not 
excessively burdened in order to ensure their general right to health. 
Another aspect to be noted in relation to the General Comment 14 is 
that it places an obligation on Member States to provide only “essential 
drugs”. As explained above WHO defines essential drugs to be those that 
“satisfy the priority health care needs” of people. Considering the essential 
and life saving function that HIV medicines carry, it is no doubt that they 
satisfy this criterion. Besides, the list of essential medicines composed by 
the WHO itself includes a number of drugs against HIV.
17
 So in this way, 
certain drugs against HIV are regarded as “essential drugs” and thus 
reference to essential drugs in the General Comment also refers to HIV 
drugs.  
 The above discussion shows the essence of access to medicines, 
including HIV medicines, in the realization of right to health. But question 
arises, what does this mean for Member States who are the main actors in 
the realization, or at least facilitation, of the entitlements, including access to 
medicines, under the right to health? Are Member States under obligation to 
ensure the access to essential drugs? Well, the CESCR in its General 
Comment 3 stated that there are certain core obligations upon states to be 
fulfilled in order to ensure that at least minimum essential levels of rights 
contained in the ICESCR are realized.
18
 In applying this interpretation in 
conjunction with Programme of Action of the International Conference on 
Population and Development (the Alma-Ata Declaration) to the right to 
health, the CESCR found that there are certain core obligations imposed on 
State Parties emanating from the right to health. In accordance to one of 
these core obligations, the states are expected to provide with essential 
drugs.
19
 States are also expected to design a reasonable action program and 
all other appropriate measures, including legislative measures, vectored 
towards full realization of the right to health. A state can be deemed to be 
                                                             
15 By health facilities, goods and services the CESCR also implies essential drugs because 
the explanatory footnote (no. 6) of the General Comment, it states that ‘any reference in this 
general comment to health facilities, goods and services includes the underlying 
determinants of health’. As mentioned above, the underlying determinants of health include 
essential drugs.     
16 See, para. 12 (b) of the General Comment. 
17 The last updated list of such medicines comprises from more than 350 different 
medicines including medicines against the disease like ‘malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
reproductive health and also chronic diseases, such as cancer and diabetes’. See, WHO, 
supra note 13. 
18 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3 on the 
nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1), 14 December 1990, UN Doc. E/1991/23, 
para. 10. 
19 General Comment No. 14, supra note 11, para. 43 (d).  
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under breach of its obligation if it, for example, adopts certain laws and/or 
policies that would impede the realization of the right to health and its 
underlying determinants.
20
 This implies that the India might be in a 
violation of its obligations if it allows the impediment to access to 
medicines, to HIV medicines in the case of this study, by having its FTA 
with the EU. Furthermore, like with other human rights, the states are under 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health. Under the 
obligation to respect the states must not interfere with the right to health and 
must not allow discriminatory practices in relation to the right.
21
 It was 
claimed that the adoption of, for example, patent laws might be a violation 
of the obligation to respect since it increases the prices of medicines and 
thus hinders the economic accessibility of drugs.
22
 Analogy can be drawn 
from this for the case of India and be argued that India would fail its 
obligation to respect in the case if the prices to HIV drugs rise above 
economic accessibility as a result of IndEUFTA. 
   All in all, above discussions demonstrate that access to medicines, 
though implicitly, is mentioned in Article 12 of ICESCR. Moreover, as 
described by CESCR essential medicines, including HIV medicines, are 
deemed to be underlying detriment of the right to health and thus can be 
deemed as a right and be claimed under auspices of the right to health. 
Moreover, in order for states to discharge their obligation under Article 12, 
they must ensure that, at least, essential medicines are economically 
accessible and that no improper legislative measures impeding the access to 
medicines are in place.  
  
                                                             
20 Hestermeyer H. P., supra note 1, p. 133. 
21 General Comment No. 14, supra note 11,, para. 34. 
22 Yamin A. E., “Not just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under International 
Law”, B.U. Int’l L. J., Vol. 21, no. 325 (2003), p. 353.   
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3 The Importance of Indian 
Generic Manufacturers  
It is important to know both local and global contribution of India’s generic 
manufacturers in facilitating access to HIV/AIDS medicines in order to 
understand and realize the extent of their importance and possible negative 
consequences for such access from some stringent provisions of IndEUFTA. 
The successful development of India’s pharmaceutical industry has not only 
been beneficial for India’s economy, but more than that it has been meeting 
the demands of patients in many developing countries and ipso facto 
stimulating access to medicines to substantial number of people inhabiting 
in those countries. To begin with, one of the most impressive achievements 
of Indian produced HIV/AIDS generic medicines is how they caused 
colossal drop in the prices of ARVs. In 2001 AIDS treatment through 
patented ARVs cost patients USD 10, 439 per year and with the introduction 
Indian generic ARVs the price dropped to USD 350 per annum (i.e. almost 
30 times drop) in the same year. And even more impressive is that coming 
to 2011 the prices of ARVs dropped to USD 99 per year (i.e. 100 times 
drop) for a patient.
23
 The price of the most frequently applied first-line adult 
regimen decreased from USD 414 per annum in 2003 to USD 74 per annum 
in 2008 as a result of generics produced in India.
24
 Significant price drops 
owing to Indian generics ‘have been instrumental’ in the global fight against 
HIV in the past decade. The number of people in low and middle income 
countries getting HIV treatment has grown from 300,000 in 2002 to more 
than 6,6 million coming to the end of 2010.
25
  
Furthermore, a study conducted in 2010 revealed that at least 80% of 
ARVs bought by low and middle income countries originate from India and 
91% of global paediatric ARVs were provided similarly by Indian generic 
manufacturers.
26
 The number of Indian generic companies providing with 
ARVs to low and middle income countries increased from 4 in 2003 to 10 in 
2008 and at the same time the variety of ARVs provided by Indian generic 
firms increased from 14 to 53 during the same period (i.e. 2003 - 2008).
27
 
Developing countries, especially countries in sub-Saharan Africa where 
HIV burden is high, including India itself are heavily reliant on the generic 
ARVs produced in India in order to sustain the national treatment programs 
that they have.
28
 Small examples are national treatment program in 
                                                             
23 Selvaraj S. and Nabar V., Access to Medicines in India: Issues, Challenges and Response 
[online], p. 91. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.hlegphfi.org/uploads/IHR_ch_06.pdf 
24 Waning B., et al, “A Lifeline to Treatment - the Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in 
Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries”, Journal of the International 
AIDS Society, Vol. 13, no. 35 (2010), p. 4.  
25
 UNAIDS (2012), supra note 5.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Chakravarty. S., (2010) India supplies 80% of AIDS medicines to developing countries 
[online]. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: http://www.indiapost.com/india-
supplies-80-of-aids-medicines-to-developing-countries/ 
28 Waning B., et al, supra note 24, p. 5. 
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Zimbabwe which gets its 90% of ARVs from Indian generic producers 
while NDSO, the state procurement agency in Lesotho, gets 95% of its 
ARVs medicines.
29
     
Apart from bringing such revolutionary change in the global price for 
ARVs, Indian generic manufacturers were also successful in decreasing the 
prices in the local markets as well. At the beginning of ARVs provision in 
Indian markets the price of it was USD 8,500 per annum. However, the 
Cipla’s, one of the biggest Indian generic manufacturers, launch of HIV 
drugs like Zidovudine, Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine in 1993 
boosted competition and caused substantial drops in the prices. In 2001Cipla 
offered full package of ARVs for USD 600 to Indian consumers.
30
 Another 
interesting feature is that, ironically enough, the US although being one of 
the strongest proponents of strong patent regimes, largely benefits from 
Indian produced generics. The US consumers are considered to be the 
biggest beneficiaries, in value terms, from the generics produced in India.
31
 
Furthermore, Indian generics are the main source to the major global 
treatment programs. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) takes 50% 
of its essential medicines from Indian generics manufacturers to distribute 
them in developing countries while 75-80% of generic medicines used by 
International Dispensary Association (IDA)
32
 similarly for distribution in 
developing countries originate from India as well. Even more, Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)
33
, the major 
                                                             
29 MSF, (year of publication is not available) Examples of the Importance of India as the 
“Pharmacy for the Developing World”. Last accessed 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/access/background_paper_indian_generics.pdf  
30 Gerster R., People before Patents. The Success Story of the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry [online], p. 3. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.medicusmundi.ch/mms/services/bulletin/bulletin200201/kap02/13gerster.html  
31 Kapczynskiti A., “Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector”, Cal. L. Rev., Vol. 97, no. 1571 (2009), p. 
1582. In 2005, approximately 63% of all dispensed prescriptions in the US were generic 
drugs and normally the prices of generic drugs were between 30 to 80% cheaper than their 
branded versions. See, Greene W., (2007) The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical 
Industry and Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market [online], p. 22. Working Paper 
No. 2007-05-A, Office of Economics of the U.S. International Trade Commission. Last 
accessed on 19 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC200705A.pdf. Another example 
of the U.S. consumption of Indian generics is the PEPFAR, the US President’s AIDS 
initiative, which buys ARVs produced by India generic companies for distribution in 
developing countries. This in its turn enabled PEPFAR to save up to 90% of costs. See, 
MSF, supra note 29. 
32 IDA Foundation was founded in 1972 by a small group of pharmacists and now it 
became one of the leading global noon-profit organizations supplying affordable 
pharmaceutical products. Coming to these days, IDA Foundation distributes more than 
3000 different kinds of medicines and medical supplies to over 100 countries around the 
world. This information is available the official website of the IDA Foundation: 
http://www.idafoundation.org/we-are/our-history.html (Last accessed on 9 October 2012). 
33
 The Global Fund is ‘public-private partnership and international financing institution 
dedicated to attracting and disbursing additional resources to prevent and treat HIV and 
AIDS, TB and malaria… Since its creation in 2002, the Global Fund has become the main 
financier of programs to fight AIDS, TB and malaria, with approved funding of US$ 22.9 
billion for more than 1,000 programs in 151 countries. To date, programs supported by the 
Global Fund have provided AIDS treatment for 3.6 million people…’The information is 
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international provider of AIDS treatment, buys 80% of its AIDS medicines 
from Indian generic suppliers.
34
 At the same time, Indian generic account 
for 80% of ARVs that MSF uses to treat 170,000 people living with HIV 
around the developing world.
35
 UNITAID
36
, another major global actor in 
fighting against HIV, informs that it has been able to provide markets both 
with pediatric and second-line drugs in 50 countries largely owing to Indian 
generic suppliers.
37
 
Overall, medicines provided by Indian generic suppliers play 
undeniably significant role in facilitating access to HIV medicines and 
fighting against the disease. Therefore, any possible curtailment of this role 
must be avoided. This also explains the reason why IndEUFTA has attracted 
such considerable attention of different actors. Numerous organizations 
including civil societies, people living with HIV (PLHIV) networks, HIV & 
public health organisations, medical organisations, public interest advocates, 
and individuals joined their effort to raise their concerns in relation to 
IndEUFTA. One example is that, 240 organizations of the kind mentioned 
and 38 individuals jointly formed the letter of appeal sent the Indian Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh, urging not trade away the lives of millions by 
accepting certain intellectual property (IP) provisions, later discussed in this 
thesis, in the IndEUFTA and to make sure that generic competition is kept.
38
    
  
                                                                                                                                                           
taken from the official website of the organization, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/whoweare/ (Last accessed on 9 October 2012).    
34 MSF, (2011) Access: Indian Prime Minister Must Resist European Pressure to Trade 
Away Health [online]. Last accessed on 9 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=4965 
35 MSF, supra note 29.  
36 UNITAID is a global health initiative founded in 2006 by the governments of Brazil, 
Norway, Chile, France and the United Kingdom with an to increase access to medicines in 
94 low and middle income countries. See, FTA Malaysia, (2012) UNITAID Warns against 
Measures to Restrict Access to Medicines in EU-India FTA [online]. Last accessed on 9 
October 2012, available at: http://www.ftamalaysia.org/article.php?aid=265 
37 Ibid.  
38 DNP+, (2010) Re: India’s central role in medicines supply is under threat. Don’t sign on 
to intellectual property provisions in the India-EU FTA [online]. Letter to Dr. Manmohan 
Singh, Prime Minister’s Office. Last accessed on 20 October 2012, available at: 
http://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/letter-to-pmo.pdf .  
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4 India’s Pharmaceutical 
Industry  
Pharmaceutical industry in India plays one of the major roles in Indian 
economy and at the same time it is one of the fastest developing sectors of 
manufacturing in India with the growing rate of 14% per year. With such 
trends India is deemed to have one of the biggest and highly advanced 
pharmaceutical industries among developing countries.
39
 Nowadays India 
with its massive production of drugs, most of which are generics, is on the 
fourth place in the world in terms of the volume of production which 
amounts to 8% of global market share.
40
 In terms of sales of drugs India is 
ranked in fourteenth place in the world, but according to the results of a 
yearlong study on the future of India’s pharmaceutical industry, India is 
predicted to become among the top ten already by 2015.
41
 Furthermore, 
Price Water House Coopers predicts that in near future, specifically by 
2020, Indian sales of medicine will have 163% grow and will reach around 
US$ 50 billion comparing to only US$ 19 billion in 2009.
42
 Furthermore, 
the pharmaceutical industry is so developed that it offers an employment to 
five hundred thousand people in around 12,000 pharmacy oriented 
companies and it is also planned to provide with 2,5 million further 
employments working in before and after production processes.
43
 These all 
are very astonishing trends and achievements comparing India’s 
pharmaceutical history since before the Second World War “there was 
virtually no [even] basic drug manufacture” in India.44 The dramatic change 
in the story of India’s pharmaceutical industry took place starting from 
1970s and only during the past 30 years the industry has advanced from 
“almost nonexistent to a world leader” producing generics with high 
quality.
45
 It is quite interesting, if not surprising, to see achievements of 
such rapid growth and advancements by India, so-called “third world 
country”, especially in the sector of pharmaceuticals where aggressive 
competition is present and where major players are mainly comprised from 
                                                             
39 Corporate Catalyst India, Report - India’s Pharmaceutical Industry [online], para. 1.2. 
Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.cci.in/pdf/surveys_reports/indias_pharmaceutical_industry.pdf 
40 Pannu, H.S. et al, “Efficiency and Productivity Analysis of Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry Using Data Envelopment Analysis”, Int. J. Operational Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(2011), p.122. 
41 Kumra G., Mitra P. and Chandrika P., India Pharma 2015 – Unlocking the Potential of 
the Indian Pharmaceutical Market [online], p. 11. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, 
available at: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/mckinseyonindia/pdf/india_pharma_2015.pdf   
42 Price Water House Coopers (2010), Global pharma looks to India: Prospects for growth 
[online], p.5. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/pharma-life-sciences/pdf/global-pharma-looks-to-india-
final.pdf 
43 Gerster R., supra note 30, p. 3. 
44 Hamied Y.K., (2005) Indian Pharma Industry: Decades of Struggle and Achievements 
[online], p.3. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.arvindguptatoys.com/arvindgupta/avra-hamied.pdf 
45 Greene W., supra note 31, p. 1. 
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industrialized countries with advanced economies.
46
 In its turn, there arises 
a question as to how India was able to reach its current position and in such 
a short period of time whereas its other alike partners have not demonstrated 
such progress. It is believed that the main locomotive bringing India’s 
pharmaceutical industry to current stage links to the fact that until 2005 
India explicitly, specifically by its 1970 Patents Act, used to exclude patent 
protection over medicines which gave huge boost to the industry through 
opening up robust competition.
47
 So as to understand more on how this 
legislative alteration benefited India and brought historical change for 
India’s pharmaceutical history, the sub-chapter 4.1 looks at the historical 
relation of patent protection with and its effects to the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry. Next, sub-chapter 4.2 examines TRIPS Agreement in Indian 
context. This sub-chapter further describes how Indian government by using 
certain “innovative” political and legislative tools was able to avoid its 
generic industry from being fully blocked. Despite of India’s 
innovativeness, its generics industry has anyway experienced certain 
barriers and this is explained in more detail section 4.2.2.  
4.1 Historical preview of India’s 
pharmaceutical industry 
It is interesting but at the same time helpful to observe history of Indian 
pharmaceutical industry since it may teach the way India took in 
accomplishing the status of being one of the dominant countries in the 
sector of pharmaceuticals. The history of Indian pharmaceutical industry has 
been highly influenced and colored by the active involvement of the Indian 
government which aimed to achieve self sufficient pharmaceutical industry 
through organizing and creating conditions which could best suit India’s 
condition. History rich with intensive changes and interventions can be 
basically demonstrated in three stages. First is the period when India was 
under British colony until it got its independence on 1947, second is the 
post-independence period until the implementation of TRIPS Agreement on 
2005 and the last is from 2005 until nowadays. 
4.1.1 Pre-independence period 
It is necessary to note that India had never had the notion of patent 
protection throughout its history until it was colonized by Britain. The first 
introduction of this notion started with the introduction of patent laws 
enshrined in the Indian patent statue of 1856 which reflected British Patent 
Law of 1852. The goal from the implementation of the statute was “to 
                                                             
46 The pharmaceutical industry is a large market with 8% growth rate and with huge capital 
circulation having around annual turnover of USD 650 billion. The competition is this 
sector of business is accompanied with rigorous competition especially for pharmaceutical 
companies from developing countries. The market is mainly dominated by companies 
established in highly industrialized countries. 48% of the global share is owned by the U.S. 
companies, 28% by the EU and 12% by Japan and only 20% by the rest of all countries, 
including India. See, Kiran R. and Mishra S., “Performance of the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Post- TRIPS Period: A Firm Level Analysis”, International Review of Business 
Research Papers, Vol. 5, no. 6 (2009), p. 1. 
47 Hamied Y.K., supra note 44.   
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enable the English Patent holders to acquire control over Indian markets”48  
whereas some other experts claim that the purpose was just to make the 
patents granted in England to be enforceable in India.
49
 The initial evolution 
of Indian indigenous pharmaceutical companies started in 1910 with the 
launch of two local companies, Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceutical 
Works and Alembic Chemicals. However, at that period the market was still 
mainly controlled by multinational companies importing bulk 
pharmaceutical products from foreign lands.
50
  In 1911 Britain enacted 
Indian Patents and Designs Act (1911 Patent Act) which conferred patent 
protection for both pharmaceutical products and process of their creation. 
This Act was seen as a main obstacle confronting Indian local companies 
from entering the market.
51
 At those times India was experiencing 
development of some industries like steel while pharmaceutical sector was 
still underdeveloped since multinational companies were able to make 
successive use of 1911 Patent Act and did not to allow production of foreign 
drugs by local Indian companies.
52
  
4.1.2 Post-independence period  
In 1947 India got its independence from Britain which meant that India 
from then on could prioritize the interest of its own people, companies, 
market and domestic conditions in general. At the time of independence 
India did not have even basic pharmaceutical production let alone self 
sufficient pharmaceutical industry and the local companies were only 
limited by mere packaging and bottling of drugs.
53
 Moreover, despite of the 
independence the market was still monopolized by foreign drug companies 
setting unaffordable prices and 99% of Indian drug patents were owned by 
foreign companies.  The government witnessing high prices of drugs and 
stunned technical possibilities of local drug companies decided to bring 
changes to the situation. Establishment of two public drug companies, 
Hindustan Antibiotic Ltd in 1954 and The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical 
Ltd, was the major step undertaken by the government to support the local 
production of essential drugs with a hope to avoid foreign dependency. 
Moreover, Indian government tried to make multinational companies to 
establish their production bases within India itself. However, these attempts 
turned to be unproductive and India still remained helpless without drugs 
                                                             
48 Mueller J. M., “The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India 's Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation”, 97 Cal. L. Rev. Vol. 68, no. 491 
(2007), p. 506. 
49 Pillai M. et al (2010), Patent Procurement in India [online], p. 2. Last accessed 8 
October 2012, available at: 
http://www.ipoef.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Programs&Template=/CM/ContentDispl
ay.cfm&ContentID=15238 
50 EXIM Bank, (2007) Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Surging Globally [online], p. 47. 
Occasional Paper No. 119.  Last accessed on 19 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.eximbankindia.com/op/oplast.pdf  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Sahu S. K, (1998) Technology Transfer, Dependence, and Self-Reliant Development in 
the Third World: the Pharmaceutical and Machine Tool Industries in India. India: Praeger, 
p. 55. 
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brought from outside.
54
 Therefore, Indian government after realizing that it 
would be impossible to bring effective changes within existing patent law 
system, the government decided to bring major changes to the whole system 
which would be reflecting national interests. With this intention there were 
consecutively appointed two committees of experts mandated to fulfill the 
task. In 1950 the first committee, headed by Indian Supreme Court Justice 
Bakshi Chand, composed a report, later named as Chand Report, stating that 
India's then existing patent system was unable to “stimulate invention and 
encourage exploitation of new inventions for industrial remedies”.55 As a 
remedy the report called the government to make effective use of 
compulsory licenses. Though compulsory license clauses contained in 1911 
Patent Act were amended, it did not bring wanted results to some extent 
because of the fact that patent owners were still able to oppose and appeal 
the issuance of compulsory licenses. Ineffectiveness of changes that were 
introduced based on the first report engendered the issuance of the second 
report in 1959 by the second committee headed by retired Indian Supreme 
Court Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar (also known as Ayyangar Report). This 
latter report is seen as “the most important catalyst for [1970] Patents Act” 
and as “form[ing] the backbone of the Indian patent system”.56 The 
Ayyangar Report urged to undertake fundamental amendments to the 
existing patent system and pointed similar views with the first report about 
the ruling patent system of that time i.e. its failure to stimulate invention and 
exploitation of new technological inventions. The committee in the report 
observed that patent could bring benefits only for the system with advanced 
economy that possesses “a large capital available for investment in 
industries and a high degree of scientific and technological education” 
whereas those benefits could not be similarly accomplished in under 
developed countries like India.
57
 Therefore, the report advised that the 
national patent system “[has] to be designed, with special reference to the 
economic conditions of the country, the state of its scientific and 
technological advance, its future needs and other relevant factors … so as to 
minimize if not eliminate the abuses to which a system of patent monopoly 
is capable of being put”. 58 As a remedy for the situation the report 
suggested to exclude medicines from patentability so as to create access to 
medicines for the public at affordable prices. Furthermore, it is also very 
crucial to highlight that the Ayyangar Report was putting emphasis on the 
fact that at those times the exclusion of medicines from patentability “was 
the accepted practice ... in virtually every European country” [emphasis 
added].
5960
  
                                                             
54 EXIM Bank, supra 50, p. 47.  
55 Mueller J. M., supra note 48, pp. 510-11. 
56 Ibid, p. 511 
57 Park C. and Jayadev A., (2009) Access to Medicines in India: A Review of Recent 
Concerns [online], Working Paper, p. 4. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436732 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 For instance, Switzerland, one of the strongest supporters of intellectual property rights 
over medicines in European arena, introduced patent protection over medicines only 
starting from 1978. See Gerster R., supra note 30. 
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The recommendations of Ayyangar Report, most importantly 
exclusion of medicines from patentability, were ultimately incorporated in 
1970 Patent Act. In particular, the Act stated that patents shall not be 
granted for “inventions claiming substances intended for use, or capable of 
being used ... as medicine or drug” and only “claims for the methods or 
processes of manufacture shall be patentable”.61 In other words, the drugs or 
medicines as such could not be patented and only the process of making 
them could be patented. This rule enabled Indian pharmaceutical companies 
to produce generics of patented medicines by merely changing some steps in 
production process and by this to outstrip patented production processes 
without violating them. Initially after implementation of 1970 Patents Act 
which excluded medicines from patentability, there was a concern that this 
law would stop multinational companies from offering new molecules to 
India which may hinder Indians’ access to necessary medicines. On 
contrary, India owing to some factors like the government’s initial financial 
support to the pharmaceutical laboratories, facilitated Indian companies to 
advance their own technical and technological expertise. As a result Indian 
pharmaceutical companies started to “successfully reverse engineer virtually 
every viable drug produced”.62 Moreover, it also engendered reduction of 
Indian market share of multinational companies from over 60% in 1970 to 
around 25% in the early 2000s.
63
 Furthermore, coming to 1999 70% of 
active pharmaceutical ingredients and 80% of formulations were locally 
produced which titled India as “possibly the only developing country in the 
world that has come this close to achieving so-called self-sufficiency in 
medicines”.64 In addition to the benefits brought to India itself such 
successful “generics-friendly patent system” of India in the long term “has 
become far-and-away the developing world's primary supplier of 
inexpensive, life-saving medicines, including first-generation ARV 
treatments”.65 
All in all, starting from 1970s the pharmaceutical history of India 
experienced impressive breakthrough firstly by fulfilling major part of local 
needs for medicine, which is itself sufficiently remarkable achievement 
considering huge population of India and secondly by meeting medical 
needs of third countries. 
4.1.3 Implementation of TRIPS - from 2005 onwards   
Prosperous status of Indian pharmaceutical sector, in particular its generics 
production, was jeopardized in 2005 through India’s introduction of patent 
protection over pharmaceuticals due to the obligation under TRIPS 
agreement. Considering that this issue opened a new chapter in 
pharmaceutical history of India and that this issue was considerably 
important in relation to generics supply in both domestic and international 
                                                             
61 Section 5 in the 1970 Patents Act.  
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 Park C. and Jayadev A., supra note 57, p. 5.  
63 Ibid, p. 6.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Bazzle T., “Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights 
in India with the Right to Health: Trips, India’s Patent System and Essential Medicines”, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 42 (2011), p. 800. 
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level, next section deals with it separately. The next section in particular 
looks at how Indian government approached its obligation under TRIPS, 
what tactics it took trying to outstrip the agreement leaving the doors for 
generic production open without breaching the agreement and finally what 
were the anyway effects to generic production and supply of India.  
4.2 TRIPS agreement in the context of 
India’s pharmaceutical industry 
In January 1, 1995 India joined World Trade Organization (WTO) and along 
with it joined WTO agreements that were obligatory to join including 
TRIPS Agreement.
66
 No doubt that Indian government was aware of the fact 
the accession to TRIPS could impede India’s generic production, but it 
seems that joining WTO outweighed this concern. A transition period that 
was allowed under TRIPS agreement for developing and least-developed 
countries
67
 gave India ten years of delay after its membership to WTO for 
the implementation of TRIPS. During this transition period the Indian patent 
law, in particular 1970 Patent Act, underwent three main changes in 1999, 
2002 and 2005. The amendment done in 1999 introduced “mailbox” 
provision based on which patent applicants could start their applications 
already from the India's transition period (i.e. 1995-2005) so that to get a 
patent protection after the end of the transition period. This amendment also 
introduced “Exclusive Marketing Rights” for patent applicants as a 
compensation for the time spent for reviewing patent application. The 
amendment of 2002 used the UK Patent Act as a model and brought even 
more far reaching changes to 1970 Patent Act. Finally, the amendments 
made in 2005 introduced product patent for medicines and shaped 1970 
Indian Patent Act to make it in full compliance with TRIPS requirements.
68
 
On December 26, 2004 the Indian government adopted the Patents 
(Amendment) Ordinance in order to give effect to aforementioned 
amendments and to launch the compliance with the terms of TRIPS 
agreement.
69
  
Y.K. Hamied
70
 described the changes brought to 1970 Patent Act 
especially through the above mentioned Ordinance as the beginning of “one 
                                                             
66 There are around 60 WTO Agreements, including TRIPS, created at 1986–94 Uruguay 
Round negotiations. Any new member wishing to join the WTO must sign and ratify all 
these agreements. See the official website of the WTO, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (Last accessed on 13 October 2012) 
67 Articles 65 and 66 of TRIPS. 
68 Yalamanchili V., “State of India’s TRIPS-Compliant Patent Regime”, Biotechnology 
Law Report, Vol. 26, no. 3 (2007), p. 215. 
69 Ibid. 
70 He is the Chairman of one the biggest and one of the main Indian generics producing 
company known as Cipla. He is described as being “[the most] closely associated [industry 
leader] with the goal of seeding the globe with low-cost generics”. See, Ghaswalla A., 
(2011) Y. K Hamied: Changing the Dialogue [online]. Last accessed 8 October 2012, 
available at: http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=744321. 
His company, Cipla, made immense contribution in producing low-cost life-saving generics 
against HIV/AIDS and considerably lowering down the prices of those drugs. This will be 
more elaborated in upcoming sections.  
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of the greatest predictable tragedies the world [had] witnessed”.71  He 
further stated that “no right-thinking person” was able to claim that India 
had gone so far in ensuring standard of living for Indians so as to justify the 
changes made to pharmaceutical legislation to launch patent rights.
72
 In 
addition many other interested groups similar to generic pharmaceutical 
companies, international organizations, NGOs and society of people leaving 
with HIV/AIDS showed strong counter reactions towards the changing 
patent laws. The Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA), an organization 
being comprised from the largest Indian generic producers, persisted on the 
Patent Act to exclude new uses and new forms of already known substances 
from patentability. Delhi Network of Positive People (DNP), an Indian 
organization representing people with HIV/AIDS, through the cooperation 
with foreign activists demonstrated protests against the changes. Moreover, 
the representatives from the WHO and the Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) submitted letters of concern to Indian government 
to encourage the government to design the laws so as to facilitate access to 
medicines and remain within the minimum requirements of TRIPS.
73
 
Consequently, the Indian Parliament was pushed to consider these raised 
concerns raised by “exceptionally globalized advocacy efforts” and bring 
several changes in new patent laws.
74
 As a result India “mapped out an 
extraordinary array of TRIPS flexibilities, some of which are unknown 
elsewhere in the world”.75 Moreover, India was seen as “the best placed to 
implement the TRIPS flexibilities” among developing countries which 
similarly had to comply with TRIPS starting from 2005.
76
 Through these 
flexibilities the Indian government was able to keep the generic production 
to certain extent. Even though there were certain effects on the volume and 
possibility of Indian generic production, which will be further discussed 
below, these flexibilities, at least, allowed to outstrip the full side effects of 
TRIPS agreement that otherwise could even fully impede Indian generic 
production. More on how India utilized TRIPS flexibilities and by this, at 
least partially, kept its generic productions is discussed in the next section. 
4.2.1 India’s use of TRIPS flexibilities 
As mentioned before, up until 2005 Indian pharmaceutical companies were 
freely able to produce generic version of patented drugs since no patent was 
granted to pharmaceutical products under Indian patent laws. However, after 
grace period given to India to implement TRIPS Agreement into its 
domestic laws expired in 2005, India was expected to, and actually did, start 
complying with TRIPS Agreement and thereby introduced patent protection 
for pharmaceutical products. A reasonable question arises, as to how India 
has been able to still continue its production of generics relatively in large 
scale even if from 2005 pharmaceutical companies could protect their 
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 Kapczynskiti A., supra note 31, pp. 1586-87. 
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75 Ibid, p. 1573. 
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products from copying by having them patented. To begin with, it is 
necessary to mention that TRIPS Agreement contains certain so called 
“flexibilities”. The aim from incorporating such flexibilities into the 
Agreement was to allow developing and least developed countries (LDCs) 
to adopt TRIPS rules that would leave them space to “pursue their own 
public policies, either in specific fields like access to pharmaceutical 
products or protection of their biodiversity, or more generally, in 
establishing macroeconomic, institutional conditions that support economic 
development”.77WIPO together with its Member States classified TRIPS 
flexibilities into four
78
:  
a) Flexibilities as to the method of implementing TRIPS obligations;
79
 
b) Flexibilities as to substantive standards of protection;
80
 
c) Flexibilities as to mechanisms of enforcement;
81
 
d) Flexibilities as to areas not-covered by the TRIPS Agreement.
82
 
In its turn Indian generic producers were partially able to retain their 
generic production owing to skillful use of TRIPS flexibilities. There are 
several tactics that Indian government used to leave the room for generic 
production while not trespassing the boundaries of TRIPS flexibilities. 
However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss each of them, but 
rather the thesis will discuss the major mechanisms that India has been 
using in order to keep its generic production. There are five such major 
mechanisms that have been more constantly used and they are, first, novel 
patentable subject matter limitations, second, more demanding rules for 
passing obviousness requirement, third, procedural limitations such as 
oppositions and disclosures, fourth, limitations for injunctive remedies
83
 and 
finally compulsory licensing. Upcoming paragraphs will discuss each of 
them in more detail.  
First, to start with discussing novel subject matter limitations one 
should first understand what the subject matter in relation to patents itself 
mean. Patentable subject matter relates to an invention which is acceptable 
to be patented and any invention must fall under the scope of this subject 
matter in order to be granted a patent protection. Generally speaking, 
                                                             
77 WIPO, (2012) Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement [online]. Last accessed 
on 8 October 2012, available at: http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html  
78 Ibid. 
79 This flexibility takes its origin from Article 1.1 of TRIPS Agreement. According to this 
provision, Member States are free to choose a corresponding way of implementing TRIPS 
Agreement in their legal system and practice. 
80 This flexibility may enable to reduce or limit the rights conferred. The examples of the 
use of this flexibility include ‘experimental use and the "Bolar" exceptions; and the 
limitation to the use of trademarks in packages and advertisement of products considered 
prejudicial to health, like alcohol and tobacco’. See, WIPO, supra note 7777.  
81 This means that Member States are able to ‘resort to their own legal system and 
practices’ while implementing their enforcement obligations under TRIPS Agreement. See, 
ibid. 
82 There are certain IP related areas that are not covered by TRIPS Agreement and Member 
States are free in dealing with those areas. The examples of such IP areas that are not 
addressed in the TRIPS Agreement are traditional knowledge, utility models, and 
handicrafts. See, ibid.  
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according to Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement patentable subject 
matters are “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology”. However, there are certain areas which fall outside the 
patentable subject matter even though they are within “a field of 
technology” and these expectations are set out by statute.84 Furthermore, 
Article 27.2 of the Agreement specifies that Member States can further 
exclude certain subject matters from patentability if their commercial 
exploitation would be against “ordre public or morality”. India in its Patent 
Amendment Act, No. 15 of 2005, went beyond what is excluded in TRIPS 
Agreement from patentability and added additional subject matters that 
cannot obtain patent protection clearly. Those “unpatentable” subject 
matters are enlisted in a separate chapter of Patent Amendment Act 
(2005).
85
 The most noteworthy among these new additions is the exclusion 
enshrined in paragraph 3(d) of the Act which specifically states that an act 
cannot be called an invention and thereby cannot be granted patent if it is:   
“(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the 
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known 
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.” 
In other words, an act cannot be called an invention if it is a mere repetition 
of a known substance just only with some changes in its form or is a new 
form of use of that substance and does not improve the efficacy of the 
known substance. This clause was essentially aimed to avoid 
“evergreening”86 of patents. Indian Patent Office (IPO) has already rejected 
to grant patents to several applications on the basis that there were mere 
amendments or extensions of known substances.
87
   
  Second strategy that India uses is a high threshold of obviousness. 
One of the standard criteria for an invention to qualify for patent grant is 
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Hepsera. See, Kumar S. et al, (2009) Evergreening of Patents and the Indian Patent Law 
[online], p. 3. Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
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non-obviousness, also known as inventive step, which means that an 
invention must not be so obvious as to be easily identifiable by a person 
with common knowledge in the field.
88
 Unlike this standard requirement, 
paragraph 2(ja) of Indian Patent Amendment Act (2005) puts some further 
requirements for an invention to be regarded as non-obvious. In particular, 
as an addition for an invention not being obvious for a person with average 
knowledge in the field, the invention must show that it technically advances 
the existing knowledge or that it has economic significance or both. In this 
way, a new form of a known invention with some advancement in its 
efficacy could get around with the clause 3 (d) Patent Amendment Act 
(2005), discussed in the previous paragraph, ‘but fail a robust inventive step 
requirement’.89 
 Third mechanism that India has been using is a procedural limitation 
such as patent oppositions. Paragraph 64 of Indian Patent Amendment Act 
(2005) provides three stages where an opposition to a patent application or 
to patent itself can be made. These stages are: pre-grant and post-grant 
oppositions while the application is still before a patent office and an appeal 
before Intellectual Property Appeal Board or a regular court suit to revoke 
granted patent.
90
 An interesting attribute of paragraph 64 is that it states that 
an opposition can be made by “any person interested”. The IPO office 
interpreted this as embracing not only generic producers but also any 
organization acting in the interest of patients. By the mid-2007 around 200 
pre-grant oppositions were filed in India among which “substantial number 
of cases” were initiated by the organizations acting in the interest of the 
public.
91
 This implies that a patent application is not only under scrutiny and 
challenge of the Patent Office and generic competitors but also NGOs 
promoting the interest of people with different disease
92
 and the latter 
sometimes can be even more careful and vigilant to make sure that the price 
and production of medicines for the treatment of the people whom they 
represent do not become inaccessible.   
 Fourth way that India uses as flexibility to its patents laws is limits 
on injunctive remedies. This means that Indian courts consider different 
issues, for example public health, while deciding whether to grant an 
injunction remedy for a patent holder claiming his or her patent being 
infringed. The precedent of such considerations by the courts was 
established in Roche vs. Cipla case where Roche, the patent holder, brought 
Cipla, Indian generic manufacturer, before the court in order to stop it from 
manufacturing patented drug owned by Roche. Cipla, in its turn, argued that 
the Court should not confer preliminary injunction since “overwhelming 
interest of society” in access to affordable and life saving drugs was at stake. 
To underpin its argument Cipla provided price difference between the 
patented and generic version of the drug in subject where the former cost 
                                                             
88 WIPO, (2009) Understanding Industrial Property [online], publication no. 895(E), p. 6. 
Last accessed on 8 October 2012, available at: 
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89 Kapczynskiti A., supra note 31, p. 1593.  
90 Ibid, p. 1598. 
91 Ibid, pp. 1599-1600  
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around USD 110 per month whereas the latter was around USD 36. After 
consideration of different aspects of the case, including price difference of 
the drugs in subject, the Court held that:  
“[It would] be unmindful of the right of the general public to access life 
saving drugs which are available and for which such access would be denied 
if the injunction were granted [and that] [t]he degree of harm in such 
eventuality is absolute; the chances of improvement of life expectancy; even 
chances of recovery in some cases would be snuffed out altogether, if [an] 
injunction were granted. Such injuries to third parties are un-
compensatable.”93  
This signifies that Indian courts take into consideration the interest of public 
rather than considering only technicalities of patent and relevant laws in 
cases related to pharmaceutical patents.  
 Last but not least, India like some other developing countries has 
been using more traditional flexibility allowed by TRIPS Agreement which 
is a possibility of TRIPS Member States to issue compulsory licensing.
94
 In 
addition to what is enshrined in TRIPS Agreement, the Indian Patent 
Amendment Act (2005) deals with compulsory licensing even more 
expansively and embraces some additional “innovative” rules. Accordingly, 
thus Indian rules relating to compulsory license were even named as 
“undoubtedly the broadest and most comprehensive of all the world’s patent 
systems”.95 Based on some rules in relation to compulsory licensing that the 
Act contains, the Indian government can import medicines that have patent 
protection in India (also known as parallel importation) “for the purpose 
merely of its own use or for distribution in any dispensary, hospital or other 
medical institution maintained by or on behalf of the Government”.96 
Another remarkable clause of the Act provides that once three years of 
patent life of a patented medicine is over, “any person interested” is entitled 
to apply to a patent controller asking to grant a compulsorily license in 
relation to the patented medicine based on any of following three grounds. 
First ground for such application is that a patent holder has not fulfilled “the 
reasonable requirements” of the public in relation to the patented medicine. 
                                                             
93 Kapczynskiti A., supra note 31, p. 1606. 
94 Generally speaking a compulsory license is a document issued by a government that 
allows the use (including manufacturing, producing, and selling) of patented product 
without the authorization of the patent owner. However, there are certain requirements to be 
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95 Mueller J. M., supra note 4848, p. 580. 
96 See paragraph 47 (4) of the Indian Patent Amendment Act (2005) 
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Second, and more striking, is that the patented medicine is not offered to the 
public at a “reasonably affordable price”. Third condition for a compulsory 
license application is that the patented medicine is not worked in India. It is 
suggested that such “ambiguity of the compulsory licensing provisions and 
the broad discretion they confer on the Controller is a source of much 
discomfort to MNC patent holders”.97 At least hypothetically, it is no doubt 
such conditions and the possibility to apply for a compulsory license under 
such grounds will make the pharmaceutical companies to be more alarmed 
to ensure that they do not give a justification a compulsory license to be 
issued. This in turn means that pharmaceutical companies will set 
“reasonably affordable price[s]” to their drugs. 
 All in all, these all flexibilities formulated by India have been 
enabling the country to deploy patents in a way suiting its economic and 
social conditions. Patentable subject matter being limited only to new 
compounds avoids evergeening of patents and prevents pharmaceutical 
companies from extending their monopolies merely with some changes and 
modifications of the same product. Moreover, high threshold of obviousness 
set by Indian patent system will further encourage pharmaceutical 
companies to be more innovative and bring technical advancements to 
existing knowledge. Possibility of patent oppositions is another challenge 
for pharmaceutical companies and a line of attack for generic competitors 
and health concerned organizations. Lastly, compulsory licensing is a tool to 
“convince” pharmaceutical companies to set the prices in an affordable 
amount and avoid other misuses of patents.  
4.2.2 Anyway effects on Indian generic production from 
TRIPS 
No matter how good India designs its flexibilities in relation to 
pharmaceutical patenting, TRIPS Agreement has anyway affected Indian 
pharmaceutical industry and the accessibility, affordability and availability 
of medicines produced therein. Therefore it is deemed that “the post-TRIPS 
era is one in which access has unquestionably been curtailed”98. This is 
inevitable especially for a country like India which for 35 years did not have 
patent protection over medicines
99
 and where pharmaceutical companies, 
their way of production, R&D spending, and competition within each other 
was adjusted to an environment without patent protection. In the absence of 
patent protection the Indian pharmaceutical companies, mainly generic 
producers, tried to set the prices as low as possible in order to survive the 
rigorous competition. However, after implementation of TRIPS Agreement 
India “has been subjected to numerous threats to its ability to manufacture 
and supply affordable generic finished products and active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs)”.100 Moreover, India has been experiencing notable 
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 Clayden P., et al (2011), 2011 Pipeline Report [online], the report prepared for i-Base 
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changes in the nature of its generic industry along with increasing number 
of product patents including many ARV drugs.
101
 In 2008 the Indian 
Parliament was informed that from January 2005 to 30 August 2007 IPO 
issued 460 product patents for pharmaceutical inventions. Out of these 
patents 392 (representing 85%) belonged to foreign applicants whereas only 
68 (representing 15%) belonged to Indian applicants. These patents were 
granted to medicines against life threatening and serious diseases like HIV, 
cancer, renal failure and neurological disorders.
102
  
Another impact that TRIPS Agreement had on India was substantial 
increase in patent applications. Currently IPO has huge backlogs in 
examining patent applications. By 2010 there were nearly 79,000 pending 
applications, out of which 6,322 were for pharmaceuticals, before IPO 
waiting for their examination. India’s start of full compliance with TRIPS 
Agreement has undoubtedly some contribution in relation to this. 
Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma while explaining the cause 
for such backlog noted that IPO experienced substantial increase in patent 
application after 2003-04
103
 which coincides to the time right before India 
implemented TRIPS Agreement. This shows that patent applicants were 
reserving a place in the queue awaiting the rights, including patentability of 
medicines, which TRIPS Agreement would confer. By February 2012 IPO 
already hired 150 new examiners with a hope to handle the excessive 
number of applications.
104
  Due to the increase of pending patent 
applications India even may need to bring some reforms to its patents 
system because it is believed that the mere increase in the number of patent 
examiners will not bring out from the problem.
105
 Another noteworthy 
factor in relation to patent grants by the IPO is that the study of 2,339 
patents granted to medicines showed that 67 of the 86 granted patents were 
not in compliance with Section 3 (d) of the Indian Patent Amendment Act 
(2005). As a result, India’s well designed flexibilities are not being fully 
benefited “because either the regulators or the executing agency do not have 
the skill, interest or wherewithal to ensure that the law is implemented in 
spirit and letter”.106 The increased work load of IPO might be another main 
cause why inventions that are not eligible for patent protection are being 
granted patents.   
It is believed that the full impact of TRIPS agreement, in particular 
patent protection over medicines, has not yet been fully experienced since 
Indian generic companies are still in control over 80% of India’s 
pharmaceutical market. In terms of HIV medicines, the fact that treatment 
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against the disease using different medicines is offered freely in India, the 
real impact of patented HIV/AIDS medicines in India will be experienced in 
the future when people affected by the disease will become resistant to 
currently offered treatments.
107
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5 Analysis of the Free Trade 
Agreement between India and 
the EU  
5.1 General background  
In 2006 the European Commission introduced a new trade policy agenda 
known as Global Europe strategy (GES) with an aim of bringing new jobs 
and economic growths. This strategy caused the Europe to refocus its 
bilateral agreements through new FTAs with Asian markets and moved 
forward its focus in the areas like IP and access to raw materials.
108
 The EU 
aimed to play a leading role in advancing global rules and standards mainly 
through international and bilateral cooperation. Seeing the suspension of the 
Doha negotiations in the WTO as “a missed opportunity for global growth 
and development”, the EU deemed FTAs as an appropriate tool to address 
the issues like “investment, public procurement, competition, other 
regulatory issues and IPR enforcement”. It was considered that in order for 
FTAs to bring positive effect, they “must be comprehensive in scope, 
provide for liberalization of substantially all trade and go beyond WTO 
disciplines” (emphasis added). By this, the EU intended to introduce 
“stronger provisions for IPR and competition, including for example 
provisions on enforcement of IP rights along the lines of the EC 
Enforcement Directive” in its FTAs.109 The GES was also an aim to start a 
second stage of the EU IPR enforcement strategy.
110
 From 2006 to 2010 the 
EU initiated several actions as a result of the GES including launch of FTAs 
with several developed and developing countries among which was India. 
Consequently, at the annual India-EU summit held in Helsinki in 2006 
leaders of both parties called for “an expansion and deepening of trade and 
investment linkages” and thus they decided to press forward their bilateral 
trade by formation of bilateral trade and investment agreement.
111
 This 
resulted in the launch of negotiations in 2007 of the FTA between the EU 
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and India (already known in this paper as IndEUFTA) the conclusion of 
which “remains a key priority” since India is deemed as the “most important 
trading partner”112 of the EU. 113   
It is worthwhile to see what factors, mainly economic, caused India to 
come to the table of negotiations with the EU, what are the benefits sought 
by the FTA and what are the positions of the parties. However, it should be 
noted that the views in relation to these differ. The main aim sought from 
having the Agreement is considered, first, “to gain preferential and 
additional market access to the negotiating partners market”. Second is to 
achieve “leverage tariff concessions into more substantial gains”.114 The 
Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (UK), funded by 
the European Commission, made a qualitative analysis of the IndEUFTA 
and its potential benefits. It was believed that the Agreement would be 
“relatively easy to negotiate” since “[t]here appears to be comparatively 
little sectoral overlap on trade structures or measures of revealed 
comparative advantage on goods between the EU and India”. This in turn 
implies that both sides “have somewhat different offensive and defensive 
interests” which ultimately should make the negotiations easier. Moreover, 
it was believed that the IndEUFTA could increase the EU’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to India by 27% while FDI stocks would increase to 18%. 
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Another forecasted benefit of the Agreement was that it could make India to 
become more convergent with international rules since India’s standards in 
their current form were not always compatible with international norms. The 
central findings of the report suggested that forecasted benefits from the 
Agreement would largely depend on “the extent to which such an FTA 
adequately identifies and deals with issues of deeper integration in areas 
such as government procurement, services, investment, trade facilitation, 
trade defence, standards, intellectual property and competition policy”. On 
the other hand the study acknowledged that there are some possible 
drawbacks and costs from the Agreement. In particular, for past couple of 
decades India has relatively diverged its economy from the EU markets to 
third countries (40% in the early 1990s against 25% in current days). In this 
sense, the Agreement could imply that India would be growing its imports 
from the EU “but at the expense of more efficient suppliers from third 
countries”. 115 Another study initiated by the EC suggested that, from 
economical perspective, India could gain €4.9 and €17.7 billion in the short 
and long terms respectively whereas gains for the EU would be €4.4 and 
€1.6 billion in the short and long terms respectively.116 The overall results of 
the study found that: 
“Even though the overall effects are positive for the EU and positive for 
India, it is clear that some sectors gain and some lose, and within the sectors, 
some people gain and some lose.”117 
Some experts further believe that “there is a compelling case to take the 
trade and investment relationship between the EU and India to a higher 
plane”118 and that overall impacts on India from the Agreement would be 
positive and India’s exports to the EU would rise in all sectors.119 On the 
contrary, some skeptics consider that the real outcomes of the Agreement 
“could be dire” for India’s economy120, that the Agreement could curb 
India’s national policy space which “risks stripping away the very tools that 
India could use to re-balance the gains from growth and to ensure that the 
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poor are not further marginalized”.121 It is further suggested that the 
“potential gains [from IndEUFTA] are modest and the risks are not 
insignificant”.122  
Although, as mentioned before, it was predicted that it would be 
“relatively easy” to negotiate the agreement, in practice, however, it does 
not seem to be true. Initially the parties planned to conclude the negotiations 
by the end of 2008. However, the negotiations have been delayed till these 
days. There are many factors and obstacles causing these delays. The EU 
officials considered that these delays were mainly caused “by bureaucracy, 
divergent interests among its member countries and slow progress on key 
issues like access to India’s legal and financial service sectors and the 
protection of intellectual property”.123 Divergent interest of the parties were 
in relation to, on one hand, India seeing the Agreement as an opportunity to 
improve market access to the EU market for its goods and services and at 
the same time expecting from the EU to abolish its non-tariff barriers for 
agricultural products imported from India. On the other hand, the EU wants 
to achieve from the Agreement its objectives set in its GES as well as get 
access to India’s protected areas like banking, retail and government 
procurement areas.
124
 Despite of all these hurdles Jose Manuel Barroso, 
president of the European Commission, on the EU-India Summit held on 
February 2012 stated that until that point both parties were able to bring the 
positions “closer in all areas and [that] the contours of the final agreement 
[were] emerging” and he expressed their commitment to intensify the talks 
with an aim to conclude it by the end of 2012.
125
 
5.2 Potential changes to Indian patent 
system from the IndEUFTA  
It is no doubt that the IndEUFTA will result in certain legislative changes in 
India. What worries more, at least in the context of this study, is how those 
legislative changes, particularly in relations to IPRs, will look like and what 
would be their implications to Indian production of generics. It is already 
predicted that if the IndEUFTA is concluded in the way the EU has been 
proposing, it will greatly undermine the possibility of India to provide with 
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affordable medicines.
126
 In particular, the proposals of the EU that may have 
substantial effect on the generic production in India and which have been 
subject to most of the discussions include data exclusivity, extensions of 
patent protection terms, and seizure of generics through border enforcement 
measures. These measures may have significant effect on generic medicines 
by delaying and/or restricting their production.
127
 More detailed analysis of 
each provision is done in the upcoming sections.  
5.2.1 Data exclusivity 
Data exclusivity is a term used in relation to a registration data used to get 
regulatory approval from an authority responsible for granting such 
approval, also known as Drug Regulatory Authorities (DRA), for a 
medicine. The registration data is obtained through testing and trials in order 
show that the produced drug passed the necessary tests and proves to have 
standard quality, safety and efficacy for consumption of human beings. 
Only after approval of DRA, the new drug can be freely distributed on the 
markets.
128
 Data exclusivity protects the registration data from unfair 
commercial use and from the revelation to the third parties without the 
permission of the originator. The data exclusivity lasts for a certain term 
depending on different jurisdictions which usually ranges from 5 (US) to 10 
(EU) years.
129 
Under data exclusivity, a DRA has two responsibilities upon 
receiving the data needed to grant a marketing approval. First is to keep the 
data in secret from other parties. Second is not to rely on the registration 
data of a drug provided by an originator to approve the production of similar 
drug by other parties. In other words, if for example a generic company 
creates a generic version of an original medicine, the DRA cannot authorize 
the marketing of that generic medicine based on the registration data of the 
original one without the permission of the owner of the original medicine. 
Consequently, the generic company has to create its own registration data. 
However, this responsibility is treated and interpreted with some disparity in 
different jurisdictions. For example, in the US and EU any kind of reliance 
is prohibited whereas in Canada it is argued that this responsibility should 
be subject to interpretation.
130
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In international level data exclusivity, although ambiguously, is 
mentioned and protected under article 39.3 of TRIPS agreement which reads 
as follows: 
“Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the 
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data 
against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless 
steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial 
use.” [Emphasis added] 
This ambiguity has left some important questions without an answer. First 
of all, the article does not indicate for how long the protection should last. 
Therefore, different jurisdictions apply a different period which generally 
ranges between 5 to 10 years, but in most jurisdictions the period is either 5 
or 10 years.
131
 Secondly, the article does not specify as to whether the 
authorities can rely on a successful registration data of a medicine and 
authorize other producers to produce similar products. As described above 
this is very important factor for other, especially generic, producers of the 
same kind of a medicine. Thirdly, it is not definite as what is meant by data 
“invlov[ing] considerable effort” so as to define the extent of effort, should 
it be economic or technical, to be put to registration data to be qualified for a 
protection.
132
 Consequently, such ambiguity in relation to very basic and 
important conditions left wide discretion for countries to apply their own 
way of application which sometimes can go far beyond what is sought in 
TRIPS agreement.  
 One of the main arguments that is used to support data exclusivity is 
that in order to develop a registration data pharmaceutical companies in 
industrialized countries spend around USD 500 million and it can take on 
average 10 years to bring such data.
133
 Accordingly, pharmaceutical 
companies claim that it should be impermissible to share the data, which 
involved such considerable costs, with the third parties without the consent 
of the originator or else there would be no incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to create new drugs at such expanses. 
In its turn, a relevant question arises as to what is added value of data 
exclusivity in comparison to patents, what is the relationship between both 
and how does it further effect generic production. It is claimed that data 
exclusivity is “an expression of trade-secrets, and that as such, data 
exclusivity should be independent of patents”.134 By this it is meant that data 
                                                             
131 10 years mostly apply in the EU countries whereas in majority other countries it is 5 
years. In exceptional countries, like in Croatia, Turkey, China, South Korea it can be either 
6 years or 8 years, like in Japan, Canada. For reference and more information about other 
countries see, IFPMA (2011), Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New 
Medicines [online]. Last accessed on 9 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_
Web.pdf  
132 Pugatch M. P., supra note 130, p. 8. 
133 IFPMA, (2000) Encouragement of New Clinical Drug Development: the Role of Data 
Exclusivity [online], p.1. Last accessed on 9 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.eldis.org/assets/Docs/29224.html 
134 Pugatch M.P., supra note 130, p. 1.  
35 
 
exclusivity is a separate protection mechanism with its own protection 
conditions and terms different from that of patents.
135
 Therefore, data 
exclusivity is becoming more popular as means of protection and its 
economic significance is growing. The reasons for this is “(i) the lengthy 
and costly process of clinical trials; (ii) the ongoing innovative productivity 
challenges (some would use the word crisis) the pharmaceutical industry 
now faces, and; (iii) the fierce legal patent disputes between research-based 
and generics-based pharmaceutical companies”.136 Theoretically, data 
exclusivity is not as restrictive as patent rights. Because unlike patents, 
where third parties are not allowed to produce a product similar to patented 
one, data exclusivity does not prevent others from generating similar data. 
However, in practice data exclusivity appears to be more limiting, especially 
for generic-based companies, since as mentioned above the significant 
portion of R&D is invested to produce the data protected under data 
exclusivity and third parties consider it to be ineffective or in most cases are 
unable to invest similar amount of resources to produce similar data.
137
 
Consequently, the data exclusivity can be considered as well thought 
protection tool by the rivals of the generic-based companies. Because, even 
if generic producers are able to overcome patent barrier through legal 
means, for example through compulsory licenses, and they will still face 
impediment when it will come to registering data to obtain an authorization 
for marketing.  The registering data of the medicine subject to compulsory 
licensing will be protected under data exclusivity and thus such registering 
data can neither be used by generic producer nor the relevant authority can 
rely on it. Consequently, generic producers will have to produce their own 
registering data, which requires huge resources that in most cases cannot be 
afforded by generic producers.  
Another interesting aspect of data exclusivity which should be noted is 
that the protection period of data exclusivity (between 5 to 10 years) is 
shorter than that of patents (at least 20 years). So a logical question arises as 
to what is the added value of the data exclusivity if its protection does not 
anyway extend the protection period of the patents and anyway expires 
within the protection period of patents. In this context, the significance of 
data exclusivity usually comes into play in cases when a drug is not 
patented
138
 in a certain country or when it is possible to challenge or 
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circumvent
139
 patents.
140
 Another scenario for the use of data exclusivity is 
when a new indication or use is designed for a patent expired medicine. 
Although it is usually not possible to get a patent extension for a medicine 
based on its new indication or use, it is allowed to grant a data exclusivity 
for a new indication.
141
 It can be very regular way of extending market 
monopoly by preventing generic competition since it is claimed that now 
pharmaceutical companies accustomed to find a new disease to treat with 
already existing medicines rather than creating a new medicine.
142
 Last but 
not least, for the reasons explained in previous paragraph, data exclusivity 
can keep effective use of compulsory licensing at bay.    
According to the report provided by the British Medical Journal 
(BMJ), European delegates have been pushing hard on India during the 
negotiations of the FTA to accept the data exclusivity protection.
143
 Like for 
other least developed and developing countries data exclusivity is a 
sensitive issue in India’s context, but it may have even farer reaching effects 
for India than for other countries. There are at least two general reasons for 
this. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, India is the world’s largest producer of 
life saving antiretroviral drugs against HIV and data exclusivity may 
additional hinder already constrained production of such drugs with the 
possibility of delaying their production at least till their data exclusivity 
expires. Secondly, unlike many other countries, India has been successfully 
and persistently taking the benefit of compulsory licensing, although argued 
by proponents of patent rights, in a way allowed in TRIPS agreement. 
However, if India opts to the data exclusivity protection then it may delay 
the production of drugs even under compulsory license.
144
 Moreover, as 
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described in Chapter 4 India imposes special requirements for patents to be 
granted and this, even after implementation of TRIPS, makes it more 
challenging for pharmaceutical companies to get patents for their drugs 
comparing in most other developing countries. This in turn has been 
keeping the doors for generic production open and avoided ever greening of 
patents. However, data exclusivity may grant monopoly for a drug much 
easier than patents since unlike patents, data exclusivity does not have 
burdensome requirements to comply with.  Some experts support the idea 
that if India brings in data exclusivity protection it may negatively affect 
India’s generic industry which may result in price increases confronting 
with public health interest.
145
 In 2007 Indian government requested the 
Committee comprising from Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals 
(DCPC) and Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers to look at the data 
exclusivity in the context of Article 39.3 of TRIPS agreement and to make 
recommendations in relation to appropriate measures to be taken. The 
Committee noted that there should a balance be kept between the ability of 
public to have access to affordable medicines and opportunity for 
pharmaceutical companies to earn revenues to cover their R&D. The 
Committee concluded that registration data could be protected under data 
exclusivity for a fixed protection period of five years. However, the 
Committee suggested that if such protection is provided, a number of 
safeguards should be adopted to avoid any negative impact on public health 
or in the cases of health emergencies. The most noteworthy of suggested 
safeguards included: 
 Making sure that in cases where a data protection was provided for 
patent drugs such protection does not in any way prolong the 
patented drugs protection period of 20 years;  
 To terminate data protection of the patented drugs subjected to 
compulsory licensing; 
 Allowing generic companies to start the application procedures and 
required studies even during the data protection period to enable 
them immediate commercialization after expiration of data 
protection; 
 Allowing Indian government to fully or partially forgo any 
provisions of data protection in a situation of public health related 
emergency; 
 Allowing India government to design its mechanism for negotiation 
the price in order to guarantee affordability and accessibility of new 
drugs for public. 
The most notably and importantly, the Committee suggested that data 
protection shall not apply for the drugs against life threatening disease like 
HIV/AIDS. It implies that even in the case of data protection Indian DRA 
could rely on the data submitted by the originator to approve marketing of 
the same drug for subsequent applicants. These safeguards and exemptions 
in cases of providing data exclusivity can avoid the impediment of generic 
production of HIV/AIDS drugs and comparatively ease the production of 
other generics. However, not less important question is whether data 
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exclusivity with these conditions would satisfy the EU and, especially, the 
influential multinational pharmaceutical companies that have been sturdily 
lobbying. It would be more logical to expect that the EU would not agree to 
such conditions. 
Nevertheless, Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma before the 
meetings for further negotiations on the EU-India FTA in 2011 stated that: 
“[t]here is no question that we will accept data exclusivity in any agreement 
with any country. On [the] intellectual property rights issue, whatever is 
discussed has to be in compliance with the TRIPS commitment.” 
At the beginning it seemed that the EU gave away its position in relation to 
data exclusivity but “in a spectacular turnaround… [the EU] seems 
determined to stand firmly by its position” in regard to data exclusivity.146 
Therefore, it is too early to conclude that the data exclusivity is put aside of 
round table negotiations and it would be more correct to rather expect that 
the subject of data exclusivity will be continued with rigorous discussions 
and negotiations until the final dot. However, if India gives up its position 
and accepts to adopt data exclusivity in the way it is proposed by the EU, 
then all consequences mentioned in this section might become inevitable.  
5.2.2 Extension of patent protection term 
In an international arena Article 33 of TRIPS Agreement sets the minimum 
protection term for patents to be twenty years starting from filing date and 
thus the standard protection term for many countries is twenty years.
 
For 
medicines this means that for twenty years a third party is not allowed, 
unless the patent holder consents, to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the 
patented medicine.
147
 Such long protection term is justified due to large 
expanses incurred by pharmaceutical companies for R&D in creating new 
medicine and by having patent protection patent holder can repel other 
competitors and be able to sell the product in considerably higher price than 
the marginal cost to recoup invested money. Any regulations seeking longer 
protection term than twenty years can be deemed to be going beyond the 
requirements of TRIPS and it will be up to the will of any country to adopt 
such longer protection term.
148
 However, proponents of patent protection, 
mainly pharmaceutical companies, afterwards started to claim and still 
claiming that even twenty years are not sufficient due to certain procedures 
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and laws that pharmaceutical industry must undergo in order to get a 
marketing approval from DRAs. Because, the patent application is done 
before the procedures to get marketing approval start and thus patent keeps 
running until a marketing approval is granted which shortens the effective 
patent term of a medicine. Accordingly, it is claimed that shortening of 
effective patent term of a medicine in this way “may result in diminishing 
profits, decreased R&D expenditures, and an eventual decline in the 
introduction of new drugs”.149 This is the main rationale behind for 
proponents of patent rights to claim for a longer patent term. In contrary, 
some argue that such extension is not needed and justified due to several 
reasons. Firstly, it can take not years but even only several months for “a 
commercially successful medicines” to earn the cost spent for R&D. 
Secondly, the usual time required for getting market approval has declined 
in nowadays. Thirdly, there are only few new active ingredients protected 
by patents and “the great majority [of other patents] cover logical extensions 
of existing knowledge or developments that are patented with the deliberate 
aim of delaying competition”.150  
Both sides have the strengths and weaknesses of their argument in 
relation to patent extension. However, when it comes to the ultimate effect 
on access to medicines, the negative effect of the patent extension is more 
obvious. Patent extension, even for administrative delays, levies additional 
burden on the public. It makes those who can afford higher prices to pay for 
a longer term and leaves those who cannot afford costs of patented medicine 
without access to medicines for a longer term. Moreover, patent holder 
might be reluctant to advance the patented medicine until patent expires and 
thus improved version of the medicine will reach the consumer later. In 
addition to such consequences that the public may encounter, there are other 
parties that may also have negative impact from extended patent terms. In 
particular, production-intensive companies in some cases develop new 
formulations or components from the existing medicine that are 
therapeutically beneficial. If patents have longer life, such developments 
will be postponed to the extent of the additional protection term that 
medicines have. Furthermore, extended patent term will boost revenues of 
only a few companies that have managed to create financially successful 
medicines. These additional revenues may enable such companies to 
perpetuate their domination in certain research areas whereas other 
companies that lack capacity may become discouraged to be involved in 
those research areas. And not to mention about research intensive 
companies based on generic production that will naturally also face less 
revenue and less production of generics.
151
  
The EU in its proposed FTA put forward to extend the patent term. In 
particular, referring to Article 9.3 of the proposed FTA patent term should 
                                                             
149 Greenberger M. et al, (1982) Patent Term Extension and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
[online], p. 3. Last accessed 15 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8119.pdf 
150 Correa C. M., (2006) Implications of bilateral free trade agreements on access to 
medicines [online]. World Health Organization Bulletin 84, p. 401. Last accessed 15 
October 2012, available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/correa0506abstract/en/index.html 
151 Greenberger M. et al, supra note 149, pp. 6-7 and 44-45.   
40 
 
be extended for additionally five years in order to cover up the time spent to 
get marketing approval.
152
 The acceptance of such terms would mean for 
India acceptance of the possible consequences for the public and 
pharmaceutical industry discussed in the previous paragraph. More 
worryingly, patent term extension in Indian context has more wide ranging 
impact and chain effect than it would have in other countries. Apart from 
possible delay of access to affordable HIV/AIDS medicines for additional 
five years for Indian public, millions leaving abroad may also be indirectly 
delayed for similar terms considering their dependency on HIV/AIDS 
medicines provided specifically by Indian generic manufacturers. However, 
positive and calming news in relation to this matter is that referring to 
Daniele Smadja who serves as the EU’s ambassador and head of delegation 
to India, the issue of patent term extension was already put off from the 
table of negotiations at the beginning of 2011.
153
  
5.2.3 Enforcement of IPRs  
Another debated issue around IndEUFTA is the enforcement measures that 
the EU is seeking to tighten in relation. More stringent enforcement 
measures are sought in order to make sure that IPRs of companies 
established in both the EU and India are not breached and in cases of 
infringements of IPRs proper, which is usually harsh, actions are 
undertaken. Such stringent enforcement measures are aimed to be realized 
through courts, executive authorities, private parties and customs 
authorities. It is considered that strict enforcement rules and regulations that 
are sought to be accomplished may result in “wrongful searches, seizures 
and legal actions against legitimate suppliers of generic medicines” and may 
“[undermine] the legitimate interests of poor patients and Indian generic 
manufacturers”.154  
TRIPS Agreement demands strict enforcement rules only in relation to 
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy and not for patent rights 
because in practice it is harder to confirm the infringements of the patent 
rights due to their complexity and necessity for technical analysis. 
Therefore, enforcement measures in this form are deemed to be more than 
what is required in TRIPS Agreement and thus are seen as TRIPS Plus. 
Nevertheless, the IndEUFTA aims to apply enforcements rules, similar to 
copyright and trademark, to the patent rights as well. For a generic 
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production industry this could mean that generics would be under 
“excessive and unwarranted enforcement measures” in cases when they are 
even suspected of patent infringement.
155
  
One of the worrisome enforcement mechanisms the EU is intending to 
have in the IndEUFTA is the possibility to involve third parties suspected in 
a patent infringement into litigation. In other words, a patent holder might 
have a right to sue all parties engaged in the circulation of suspected 
generics which may include from manufacturer to the supply chain of the 
generic in subject. By this, important actors in the distribution of affordable 
medicines can be dragged into litigation even though they were not directly 
involved in the manufacture of the drug.
156
 For example, even an NGO or 
philanthropic organisation getting a generic medicine for a non commercial 
use and supplying it to those in need may be also brought under the court if 
the generic medicine in subject is later found or even suspected in patent 
infringement. This may ultimately discourage third parties like humanitarian 
and philanthropic organizations that play crucial role
157
 in supplying life 
saving and affordable HIV/AIDS medicines from dealing with generics. 
Moreover, the EU wants to empower courts to issue an order to temporarily 
stop the circulation of generics, including manufacture, selling, and 
distribution by third parties, even based on a suspicion that generic might be 
infringing patent rights until the suspicion becomes clear.
158
 This may 
inevitably delay the on time circulation of HIV/AIDS generics even based 
on suspicions whereas the time plays vital role in particular in relation to 
such life saving drugs. In addition to issuing such orders, the EU wants to 
empower the courts to issue orders that allow physical seizure of “goods, 
materials and implements used in the production and/or distribution of such 
goods and the freezing of bank accounts [of parties involved], even in cases 
where infringement has not yet been proved”.159 
Another issue at stake is border enforcement measures. The 
IndEUFTA in its current form demands India to have border measures not 
only to imported products but also to exported ones. However, it should be 
noted that patented products are excluded from the scope of border 
enforcement measures. But even so, the border enforcement measures for 
trademarks can become a reason for a disruption of provision of generics. 
One example for this is the an antibiotic generic amoxicillin originating 
from India which was prevented from reaching its destination by custom 
officials of Frankfurt airport on the suspicion that it breached 
GlaxoSmithKline’s trademark name “Amoxil”. However, the customs 
officials were later informed by the GlaxoSmithKline that the drug did not 
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violate the trademark name since the amoxicillin was in the public domain 
as an international non-proprietary name. Yet, the drug had to reach its 
destination, which was a least developed country Vanuatu, late.
160
 Another 
aspect of border enforcement measures in relation to trademarks is that, if 
applied as the EU wants, a trademark holder will not need to have judicial 
determination of infringement or declaration of a court in relation to 
trademark infringements, but rather the trade mark holder can directly 
request custom officials to seize and detain a consignment of generic drugs 
in the cases of suspicion of trademark violation. Therefore, it is considered 
that “unnecessary and harmful interruptions” to the supply of medicines 
may take place if trademark protection is not also taken away from the 
scope of border enforcement measures enshrined in the IndEUFTA.
161
   
On the other hand, patent holders also have their legitimate claim to 
ask for enforceable and realizable IPRs so that to protect their interests that 
required considerable effort and resources. Therefore, it would not be 
rational to demand total loosening of IP border enforcement measures, 
which is not also the claim of this thesis, which may ultimately result in 
deliberate and abusive IPRs infringements. However, from above analysis it 
is evident that the EU is pushing forward stringent enforcement measures 
that may go beyond mere protection and enforcement of rights of patent 
holders and instead may, as mentioned above, undermine the legitimate 
interest of poor people and Indian generic industry.  
5.2.4 Wide scope of investment protection 
The EU is using different tactics in the IndEUFTA to anyway ensure that 
IPRs, including patents, are vigorously protected as in the way the EU 
would want. While the issues of intellectual property logically should be 
dealt under IP chapter of the IndEUFTA, the EU achieved to launch front of 
intellectual property negotiations under “investment chapter” as well. This 
was achieved through wide and open-ended definition of investment that 
includes “almost every of asset owned or controlled by an investor of both 
parties”. In particular, the term investment is defined to be covering “foreign 
direct investment, shares, debentures, loans, interests, business concessions, 
movable and immovable property, intellectual property rights, goodwill, 
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technical processes and know-how” (emphasis added).162 By having patent 
rights under the investment chapter, patent holders will enjoy protection 
granted for investments as an addition to the protection measures provided 
under IP chapter in the ways explained below.  
First, the investment chapter prohibits the governments from, both 
explicit and implicit, expropriation of foreign investment. The implicit 
expropriation in this context means to be any regulatory or policy actions 
undertaken by the government that could obstacle the enjoyment of 
investment by foreign investors. In this sense Indian government can be 
challenged, for example, where it tries to support domestic generic 
producers by advancing domestic flexibilities for IPRs or even in other 
instances where it aims to adopt regulations or policies for the support of 
public health which could interfere with the patent rights, equally treated as 
investment, of foreign companies. In addition to this, even the court 
decisions and judgments in relation to patent rights can be subject to 
opposition and challenges in the international arbitration by patent holders.  
However, it should be noted that investment chapter states that the 
rules of expropriation shall not apply for cases of compulsory license if 
those were issued in compliance with TRIPS Agreement. So in this way a 
state can apply compulsory license on a medicine and allow generic 
production of it without being deemed as “expropriating investment” of 
foreign pharmaceutical company. Nevertheless, the safeguard against 
expropriation clause relates only to compulsory licensing which means that 
other regulatory and policy actions for the promotion of access to affordable 
medicines can be still challenged.
163
  
Second, the EU wants to insert in the investment chapter “a fair and 
equitable treatment” standard. This standard requires the state to provide 
minimum standards to foreign investors no matter how the state treats its 
own domestic investors. Strictly speaking, this means that, for example, if 
the state has a special treatment of domestic pharmaceutical companies, it 
should not apply such treatment to foreign pharmaceutical companies if 
foreign pharmaceuticals companies regard the treatment not to be “fair and 
equitable”.164 The standard of fair and equitable treatment is a new 
breakthrough in international agreements and thus usually does not follow 
with a concrete definition which leaves it uncertain as to what exact 
obligations must a state fulfill under this standard.
165
 Consequently, this 
usual uncertainty has left wide discretion for arbitral tribunals to define what 
is meant by “fair” and “equitable” treatment. In some cases arbitral tribunals 
enjoying this wide discretion decided against the governments’ decisions or 
policies created for the interest of public.
166
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Third, the EU in its investment chapter is seeking to involve “national 
treatment” and “most favored nation” (MFN) treatment in accessing India’s 
markets. This would mean that India will not be able to treat its own 
domestic investors in more privileged way than foreign investors since 
according to MFN treatment India would have to give the same privileges 
and benefits to European investors as it gives to any other foreign investors. 
These factors, consequently, limits the India’s capacity to design its market 
in a way so as to boost and keep the production of affordable medicines by 
supporting domestic generic manufactures.
167
 In addition to the mentioned 
two kinds of treatment, the EU in its draft IndEUFTA put forward to confer 
foreign investors “pre-establishment” protection which could mean that 
investors would be able to have legal action even before having their 
investment in India.
168
 This increases potentiality of legal challenges to 
India by outsiders, especially by large pharmaceutical companies, to curb 
India’s generic production. 
Fourth, the IndEUFTA in the form put forward by the EU allows 
foreign investors to have arbitration directly against the state. This feature of 
the investment chapter of the draft IndEUFTA is regarded as “the most 
problematic” since it enables foreign investors to directly bring India to a 
secret arbitration tribunal and claim for a compensation for any regulations, 
policies, court decisions or any other actions of the government that could 
impede foreign investors in enjoying their investments. By this, foreign 
investors would be able to avoid domestic courts and procedures and have 
their case being heard by an arbitral tribunal.
169
 This can be problematic for 
India’s ability to generate affordable medicines at least in two ways. First, 
as described above, tribunals sometimes rule against government actions 
even though those actions were undertaken to benefit public interest. This 
implies that it would be harder for India to win the cases related to 
compulsory licenses or patent challenges done by domestic generic 
manufacturers when the case is brought before arbitral tribunal. Second, 
Indian courts while deciding cases in relation to pharmaceuticals gives 
special care to life saving pharmaceuticals and they treat such 
pharmaceuticals different from others basing the cases also on human rights. 
The case of Roche, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, against Cipla, an 
Indian generic manufacturer, over the patent rights of the anticancer drug 
“erlotinib” sold and owned by Roche under the name “Tarceva” could be an 
example. In this case the Delhi High Court stated that an injunction to stop a 
manufacture of generic version of the drug could violate Article 21 of the 
India Constitution which provides with right to life. The Court noted the 
seriousness of the issue of having the right to access to life saving drugs and 
the necessity of having long term supply of them in India. Ultimately, the 
Court considered that the possibility of having damage to general public 
from not having generic version of such life saving drug can serve as a basis 
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for a refusal to grant an injunction.
170
 However, if the cases are heard before 
arbitral tribunals, foreign pharmaceutical companies will be able to 
circumvent Indian national courts which, as explained, take into account 
human rights and public interest while deciding cases rather than treating all 
cases similarly. The practice has showed that it was extremely challenging 
for governments to justify their actions based on public interest safeguards 
while having their cases heard before arbitral tribunals.
171
  
The possible risk caused by drafted investment chapter is not based on 
just hypothetical predictions. There have been several cases observed where 
companies relying on the rules contained in the investment chapter were 
able to sue governments for carrying out actions for public health interest. 
For example, the Swiss based multinational company Philip Morris sued 
Uruguay for measures undertaken for the benefit of public health by 
requiring the company to enlarge the size of warnings on the cigarette. The 
dispute was launched in accordance with 1991 Switzerland - Uruguay 
Bilateral Investment Treaty which enabled foreign investors, like in the 
current investment chapter of the EU-India FTA, to directly bring the case 
against the government before an arbitral tribunal. Philip Morris based its 
claim, among others, on “expropriation” of company’s trademark and 
impediment with its investment rights. Another similar case, but involving a 
pharmaceutical company, was noted in the case of Brazil issuing a 
compulsory license for efavirenz, an anti retroviral medicine, belonging to 
Merck. The company made a press release similarly naming this action of 
the government as “expropriation” of IP.172 The investment chapter is seen 
to be bringing new “TRIPS-plus-plus” rules that could limit the 
government’s ability to implement measures to boost public health and 
especially access to affordable medicines.
173
 
5.3 Consequent impact on access to 
medicines – lessons learnt from other FTAs 
The before sections made the analysis of possible legislative changes and 
their potential effects on affordable medicines that India may encounter after 
having signed the IndEUFTA in the form proposed by the EU. However, it 
is necessary to go beyond probabilities and rather to see actual effects on 
access to medicines by looking at the experience of other developing 
countries that already signed FTAs with similar character and learn what 
kind of impacts brought to the medicines. Even though the EU has signed 
FTAs with number of developing countries
174
, there are no studies available 
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about how an FTA specifically signed with the EU affected access to 
medicines in partner developing country. However, as mentioned before 
there are instead some studies available instead in relation to the FTAs 
between Jordan, Colombia, Peru and Thailand each having with the U.S.. 
Considering that these FTAs have similar characteristics and provisions to 
that of the IndEUFTA, it is possible to come up with relevant conclusions 
for the case of IndEUFTA and thus this will be the main aim of upcoming 
two sections. The study of the Jordanian FTA with the U.S. provides more 
thorough analysis and thus merits a discussion in a separate section.  
5.3.1 Lessons learnt from Jordan-U.S FTA 
Jordan signed its FTA with the U.S on October 24, 2000 and it entered into 
force in December 17, 2001. By this Jordan became in general the third 
country and the first Arab country signing an FTA with the U.S. (hereinafter 
JorUSFTA). The Agreement aimed at creating a free trade zone between 
both partners by involving their certain commitments in different areas 
including intellectual property rights. The aim was to be achieved by steady 
removal of duties and commercial barriers during upcoming 10 years and to 
have full free trade area starting from January 1, 2010.
175
  
 One of the similar attributes that JorUSFTA may have with 
IndEUFTA is the introduction of data exclusivity. However, unlike in the 
IndEUFTA, the conditions of data exclusivity are not explicitly mentioned 
in the JorUSFTA. Rather, Jordan had to introduce data exclusivity under 
national law, in particular Article 8 of 2000 Unfair Competition Law and 
Trade Secrets Law No. 15, as a precondition to have the FTA with the 
US.
176
 Accordingly, it was not possible anymore for Jordanian generic 
manufacturers to get a marketing approval relying on the data submitted by 
the originator. In practice, pharmaceutical companies in Jordan are making 
more regular use of market monopoly granted by data exclusivity rather 
than addressing the issue to patent rights. Based on studies of 103 medicines 
registered and produced starting from 2001that did not have a patent 
protection, it was found that even though these drugs did not have patent 
protection, 79% of them enjoyed monopoly because of data exclusivity. 
Another study showed that total sales of 81 drugs out of 108 that did not 
have a generic version because of data exclusivity and this gave extra cost 
of USD31.49 million from mid 2002 to 2006 which represented 68% of the 
total sales of all new drugs that does not have generic version.
177
  
                                                                                                                                                           
(2000), Palestinian Authority (1997), South Africa (2000), Syria (1977), and Tunisia 
(1998), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/agreements/#_europe (last accessed on 15 October 2012). 
175 The American Chamber of Commerce in Jordan, (2009) Jordan – U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (JUSFTA) [online]. Last accessed on 15 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.amchammena.org/Jordan/Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf  
176
 Ryan M. and Shanebrook J., (2004) Establishing Globally Competitive Pharmaceutical 
and Bio-Medical Technology Industries in Jordan, International Intellectual Property 
Institute and AMIR, p. 19. 
177 Oxfam, (2007) All costs, no benefits: How TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules in the 
US-Jordan FTA affect access to medicines [online], p. 9. Last accessed on 15 October 
2012, available at: http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/bp102_jordan_us_fta 
47 
 
The best illustrative example of how data exclusivity affected the 
price of medicines can be captured by the comparison made between the 
price of medicine having protection under data exclusivity in Jordan and the 
price of its generic equivalent. The price of five best selling drugs used for 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease in Jordan and Egypt was compared to 
see the difference between the prices of those drugs produced in Jordan 
having data exclusivity protection and the prices of their generics version 
produced in Egypt where no data exclusivity protection was available (see 
Table 1).
178
  
Table 1: Comparison between prices of drugs with no generic competition in 
Jordan due to having data exclusivity protection and the prices of their generic 
equivalent in Egypt 
Active 
Pharmaceutica
l Ingredient 
(dosage) 
Medical use 
Country 
(company) 
Price per Unit 
(in Jordanian 
dinars at 
prevailing 
exchange rate) 
Jordan 
price 
compared 
to Egyptian 
price 
Metformin (800 
mg vs. 500 mg) 
 
Anti-diabetic 
Egypt (local generic 
company)  
.02 
800% 
 Jordan (Merck) .16 
 
Atenolol (100 
mg) 
Anti-
hypertensive 
Egypt (local generic 
company)  
.03 
367% 
Jordan (Kleva) .11 
 
Rosiglitazone 
maleate (4 mg 
vs. 2 mg) 
Anti-diabetic 
Egypt (local generic 
company) 
.40 
167% 
Jordan (Glaxo 
SmithKline) 
.67 
 
Simvastatin (20 
mg) 
Anti-
hyperlipide
mic 
Egypt (local generic 
company) 
.452 
498% 
Jordan (Merck) 2.25 
 
Ramipril 
Anti-
hypertensive 
Egypt (local generic 
company) 
.14 
557% 
Jordan (Sanofi-
Aventis) 
.78 
 The table above demonstrates enormous difference of the prices of 
the drugs even though having similar content and medical use. This price 
difference is generated by not having generic competition in the market due 
to the monopoly granted by data exclusivity. The studies identified that the 
government of Jordan and consumers “could have saved between [USD 6,3 
million] and [USD 22,04 million] on the 81 medicines that have no generic 
equivalent due to data exclusivity”.179 This is considerable amount of health 
spending for a country like Jordan where “chronic high rates of poverty, 
                                                             
178 The data is taken from, ibid, p.10. 
179 Ibid, p. 14. 
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unemployment, inflation, and a large budget deficit” exists180 along with 
poverty rate anywhere between 15 to 30%.
181
 Moreover, 40% of Jordanians 
are not covered by health insurance which implies that the cost for the drugs 
is paid from the pocket of such high percentage of people.
182
  
The JorUSFTA, in general, caused a sudden and notable increase in 
the prices of medicines. By 2006 medicines in Jordan got 20% more 
expensive after the enforcement of the JorUSFTA in 2001. Considerable 
number of therapeutic classes of medicines
183
 underwent price increases. 
From 2001 to 2006, the price of 91 therapeutic classes rose for more than 
20% whereas 88 other therapeutic classes had increase in the price up until 
20%.
184
 Similarly, Jordanian hospitals observed “an alarming surge” in 
spending for pharmaceuticals starting from 2002. The Royal Jordanian 
Hospital calculated that between 2002 to 2006 pharmaceutical expenditure 
rose up to six-fold which indicated increase in spending from two million to 
twelve million Jordanian Dinars annually.
185
 In 2006 patients were regularly 
complaining about sudden increase of essential drugs in the previous few 
years and were informing that they were not being able to afford high prices 
of drugs sold in private pharmacies.
186
 These price increases for essential 
drugs were also acknowledged by top officials and raised their serious 
concern for impeding access to life saving medicines to a large number of 
people living in Jordan. The National Health Strategy (2006-2010) stated 
that the “surge in the spending on medicines in the public and private 
sectors” poses one of the major risks “to the continuity of health 
programmes and sustainability of their financial resources”.187 JorUSFTA 
also has been directly contributing to the delays in the Jordanian generic 
production and thereby production of affordable drugs. Local companies 
stated that the possibility to produce generic version of original drugs had 
been delayed from 6 to 9 years.
188
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5.3.2 Lessons learnt from other FTAs 
Beginning from May 2004 Columbia started negotiations with the US on an 
FTA (hereinafter ColUSFTA) between both countries. One of the main 
focuses of the negotiations was the IPRs. In February 2006 both parties 
were able to end the negotiations and agree on the text of the ColUSFTA. 
Based on this available text, a study was done using a method developed by 
the World Health Organization and Pan American Health Organization
189
 to 
estimate the impacts on pharmaceutical spending and access to medicines in 
Columbia. The studies concluded that if no measures were taken to lessen 
the impact of the ColUSFTA, by 2020 the ColUSFTA with its intellectual 
property chapter would enable to achieve a market monopoly in the level of 
around 63% as a result of both patent and data exclusivity. Consequently, 
this would enormously curb generic competition, large portion of domestic 
pharmaceutical market would experience monopoly prices, and domestic 
pharmaceutical industry would face severe constraints by possibility of 
losing up to 57% of its current market share value. Price index for 
medicines would also rise to around 40%. In addition, by 2020 Columbia 
could experience an increase of USD 919 million in spending on 
pharmaceuticals, or which equals to health care expenditure of 5.2 million 
Columbians contributing in the social security system that year. If spending 
on pharmaceuticals was not increased by public health care in accordance to 
price increases, this could result in 40% drop in medicine consumption 
which inevitably implies impediment for access to medicines, especially, for 
those who cannot meet the expense of higher prices.
190      
 On April 12, 2006 Peru signed Trade Promotion Agreement, equal 
to an FTA, with the US (hereinafter PerUSFTA) and consequently the 
Agreement entered into force on February 1, 2009.
191 On April 2005, the 
Ministry of Health of Peru conducted a study to examine potential impacts 
of this agreement to access to medicines in Peru. The studies found that 
already in the first year after the enforcement of the Agreement, the average 
price of the drugs would increase to 9.6% whereas original drugs would 
increase to 12.5% and branded generics to 4.3%. The average prices would 
increase between 55% to 100% whereas original medicines would increase 
between 72% to 132% most probably in the period from 2011 to 2017. In 
the extreme case where generic copies would be driven out of the market, 
the price of original medicines could rise up until 225% in the same period. 
Already in 10 years Peru would experience USD 199.3 million additional 
costs for medicines out of which USD 110 million would need to be covered 
                                                             
189 These two bodies in collaboration introduced ‘Guide to estimate the impact on access to 
medicines of changes in intellectual property rights’. See, Rovira J. et. al., (2005) Guía 
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by Peruvian households. Data exclusivity protection would engender USD 
34.4 million additional costs for medicines already in one year after the 
enforcement of the Agreement. Of this total, USD 29 million would need to 
be borne by private Peruvian households and the remaining by Ministry of 
Health of Peru. Between the seventh and thirteenth years after enforcement, 
the additional costs were estimated to reach from USD 130 to 170 million.     
With regards to access to medicines, the foremost effect would be 
experienced in the first five years after the enforcement of the PerUSFTA. 
In this period it was forecasted that the drug consumption could fall between 
2.4 to 3.1%s or which alternatively means that from 700,000 to 90,000 
people would be unable to have access to medicines if the budget of 
Peruvian Ministry of Health and income of poor people would not be 
increased. Moreover, traditional medicines in Peru are becoming less 
effective for the diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculoses and thus 
people affected by these diseases are in need to switch to new 
pharmacological breakthroughs. However, as an impact of PerUSFTA 
access to such new breakthroughs might be delayed or even not occur due to 
price increases.   
Another noteworthy factor is how market composition would change 
as a result of the PerUSFTA. As a result of market deregulation at the 
beginning of the 1990s in Peru, the Peruvian pharmaceutical market 
structure in 2004 became comprising of 83% generic drugs against 17% of 
original ones. After the enforcement of the intellectual property rules 
contained in the PerUSFTA, the market would experience considerable 
change in its composition. In particular, in thirteen years after the 
enforcement, the original drugs would take over 69% of the market leaving 
only 31% to generic versions. According to predictions these original drugs 
would focus only on the demand of people with medium to high purchasing 
power leaving the demand of poor people unmet.
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In 2004 Thailand and the US started talks on drafting an FTA 
(hereinafter ThaiUSFTA) between both countries. The negotiations were 
focused on the matters like intellectual property rights, customs and ways of 
pushing forward WTO Doha negotiations.
193
 The issues at stake in the 
ThaiUSFTA that went beyond TRIPS Agreement were, first, extension of 
patent term for unreasonable delays caused by procedures required for 
patent grant or marketing approval. Second, the ThaiUSFTA required 
linkage of marketing approval process and patent status of a drug.
194
 Third, 
it introduced data exclusivity protection for the period of five years.
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A study funded by the Thai FDA and Ministry of Health was launched 
to evaluate the impact that afore mentioned three changes in Thai patent 
system would have on access to medicines in Thailand. The results of the 
study indicated that 10 year patent term extension due to delays, a 5 year 
postponement due to linkage of marketing approval process and patent 
status of a drug, and a 10 year delay resulting from data exclusivity would 
cause 67 percent increase of drug prices bringing additional spending of 
USD 23,595 million in following 20 years after the enforcement of the 
ThaiUSFTA. The domestic industry would also lose USD 9,000 million 
from such scenario.
196
 In the conducted study an investigation of 35 
different cases for patents that may affect access to medicines due to 
ThaiUSFTA suggested that patent term extension would have the greatest 
negative effect on access to medicines. The investigation presented that in 
subsequent 20 years after enforcement of the ThaiUSFTA a patent term 
extensions for 10 years, for example, would result in the rise of spending on 
medicines for around USD 11,191 million and there would be loss of USD 
3,370 million for domestic pharmaceutical industry mainly because many 
domestic companies are based on generic production. Alternatively this 
could imply 32% increase in the price index for medicines by 2027. It was 
further shown that in shorter term, negative economic impact of data 
exclusivity would be more than a 5 year patent term extension whereas the 
positions would change in longer term (i.e. patent term extension would be 
more economically damaging than data exclusivity). Moreover, it was 
suggested that data exclusivity would have more negative impact especially 
in a situation where a medicine did not have a patent protection.
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5.4 Conclusions to be drawn in relation to 
the IndEUFTA 
The analysis made in the previous chapter indicate, through the actual 
experiences of Jordan, Colombia, Peru, Thailand, how an FTA containing 
TRIPS Plus provisions may hinder availability of cheap medicines and by 
doing so hinder access to medicines of, especially poor, people leaving in 
those developing countries. Consequently, India should make corresponding 
conclusions from the experience of those countries. Especially the case of 
Jordan is more concrete since Jordan has already felt the actual impact on 
both availability of affordable medicines and access to medicines in reality 
rather than just hypothetically anticipating them.  
On contrast, the case of India may even have even farer reaching 
results and negative impact on access to HIV/AIDS medicines and other 
medicines in general. Because, as demonstrated in the Chapter 3 India, first, 
                                                                                                                                                           
DRA to approve application of a generic drug. See, MSF, (2011) How the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement Threatens Access to Medicines [online]. Last accessed on 15 
October 2012, available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/2011/MSF-TPP-
Issue-Brief.pdf  
195 Kessomboon N. et al., “Impact On Access to Medicines from Trips-Plus: a Case Study 
of Thai-US FTA”, Journal of Southeast Asian J Trop. Med Public Health, Vol. 41, no. 3  
(2010), pp. 670-671 
196 Ibid, p. 674.  
197 Ibid, pp. 673-74. 
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have been massively supporting and promoting access to medicines to its 
local people and at the same time to the extensive number of, mostly 
financially vulnerable and dependant, people outside its borders owing to its 
large scale of generic production. Oxfam, one of the leading charity 
organizations, estimates that the number of people being prevented from 
access to affordable to medicines due to IndEUFTA could be hundreds of 
millions.198 Another very particularity and importance of the IndEUFTA 
from other FTAs lie on the fact that, as noted by Philippe Douste-Blazy, 
Chair of UNITAID’s Board199, “[IndEUFTA] coincides with a delicate time 
for access to treatment efforts” when the grants by the Global Fund are 
being suspended and resources for health and development are decreasing.200 
In other words, the global price for HIV/AIDS medicines can be on rise due 
to IndEUFTA whereas the funds for the facilitation of access to HIV/AIDS 
medicines in contrary are dropping. This will logically bring distressing 
situation for access to medicines of especially poor people residing in 
developing and least developed countries. The seriousness of the situations 
particularly around IndEUFTA is acknowledged in an international level by 
numerous leading NGOs, funds, and experts in the field.201 The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Anand Grover, 
acknowledged that draft of IndEUFTA “could prevent people from all over 
the world from gaining access to life saving and life prolonging medicines” 
and “have a devastating public health impact and affect the right to health 
for millions of people” by hindering generics production. These give the 
                                                             
198 Banks M. (2012), EU Urged to Avoid ‘Pressurising’ India at Summit [online]. Last 
accessed on 16 October 2012, available at: http://www.theparliament.com/latest-
news/article/newsarticle/eu-urged-to-avoid-pressurising-india-at-summit/  
199 “In 2006, Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom decided to create an 
international drug purchase facility financed with resources that would be both sustainable 
and predictable. The initiative was given the name UNITAID, and a tax on airline tickets 
was chosen as the most appropriate means of providing sustainable funding. 
UNITAID was officially launched on 19 September 2006 in New York at the opening 
session of the United Nations General Assembly. Today, UNITAID fills a critical gap in 
global health financing. It provides a sustained and strategic market intervention that aims 
both to decrease the price of medicines for priority diseases and to increase the supply of 
drugs and diagnostics”. The information is taken from the official website of UNITAID, 
available at: http://www.unitaid.eu/who/background?id=159  
200 The Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and Malaria is becoming unable to issue new grants 
to countries due to the considerable cuts in the funding of the Fund by donors. This is 
mainly due to the financial crisis that the world has been experiencing. In the 2010 New 
York Meeting the Fund was able to manage only USD 11.7 billion out of sought USD 20 
billion. The Guardian, (2011) Crisis Looms as Global Fund Forced to Cut Back on Aids, 
Malaria and TB Grants [online]. Last accessed on 15 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2011/nov/23/aids-
tuberculosis  
201 Among them are: MSF, UNITAID, IDA Foundation, Oxfam, Delhi Network of Positive 
People, European Parliament Working Group on Innovation, Access to Medicines and 
Poverty-Related Diseases, and Elton John AIDS Foundation. The majority of these 
organizations have been actively involved in scrutinizing the IndUSFTA by organizing 
different campaigns including public demonstrations, publications and information 
awareness. Some of them also have sent official letters to relevant bodies condemning 
dangerous provisions of the FTA and calling for their reconsideration. The copies of these 
official letters are available at: https://donttradeourlivesaway.wordpress.com/letters-to-
officials/  
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scenario and possible outcome from the realization of the draft of 
IndUSFTA being dressed with the provisions discussed before.  
 On other hand, it would not be reasonable and objective to claim that 
only “badness” emanates from IndEUFTA and that is all about harm. As 
described in sub-chapter 5.1 there are certain economic benefits sought and 
expected from the IndEUFTA benefiting both sides and people inhabiting 
there. At the same time it is essential to note and acknowledge the important 
role that IP plays for the economy of a country ‘by providing the freedom to 
innovate, allowing incentives to encourage innovation and protecting those 
innovations”.202 Pharmaceutical industry especially needs IPRs more than 
any other industry since it is the main tool that pharmaceutical companies 
use to enable them to recoup considerable investments they make in 
bringing up a new product to the market. The importance of the IPRs in this 
sense is undeniable but more important questions remains as to whether 
IPRs rules being sought in the form proposed in the draft IndUSFTA can be 
beneficial for developing country like India. As pointed out by Carlos 
Correa, one of the leading experts in IPRs in the context of developing 
countries, “uncontestable and solid set of studies . . . that consistently 
indicate . . . that developing countries are going to suffer from substantial 
price increases and other costs” from tighter IP rules.203 More than that, the 
US Congressman Henry Waxman, strong proponent of IPRs who used to be 
one of the main players for introduction of stronger IPRs in the US through 
commented on how stronger IPRs practiced in the developed countries may 
affect developing countries if applied similarly. In particular, he criticized 
the attempts of the US to apply IP rules similar to its own to other 
developing countries. He expressed these strong words: 
“[Such stricter IP rules exercised in the US] delay market entry of low-cost 
generic drugs for years after a life-saving drug becomes available . . . [The] 
system works in this country because most people … in the U.S. have health 
insurance that pays for essential drugs and because we have a health care 
safety net to assure that the poorest in our society are not left without medical 
care and treatment. But to impose such a system on a country without a 
safety net, depriving millions of people of life-saving drugs, is irresponsible 
and even unethical.”
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In addition to this, a report prepared by the Commission on IPRs205 in 2002 
underpinned the actuality of the claim that it might not be in the interest of 
developing countries to incorporate stricter IPRs because it may result in the 
                                                             
202 Matthews M. and Giovanetti  T., (2002)Why Intellectual Property is Important? 
[online], p. 2. Last accessed on 16 October 2012, available at: http://www.ipi.org/docLib/II-
CaseForIP-2.pdf-OpenElement.pdf  
203 Correa C., (2000) Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries. 
London: Zed 
Books, pp. 36-37.  
204 El-Said H., supra note 186, p. 444. 
205 The Commission was established by the initiative of the government of the UK and 
tasked “…to look at the ways that intellectual property rules need to develop in the future in 
order to take greater account of the interests of developing countries and poor people”. The 
Commission is composed from six Commissioners from range of expertise including 
professors, barrister in IP, a senior official of the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, and other 
experts in the field. For more information see the official website of the Commission, 
available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/about.htm [last accessed on 16 October 
2012] 
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increase of prices of medicines and thus hinder access to medicines. The 
report stated that “[d]eveloping countries should not be coerced into 
adopting stronger IP rights without regard to the impact this has on their 
development and poor people”. The report further suggested that IPRs 
should rather be adopted in accordance to the development status and 
specific situations existing in a country.206   
These expressed views the experts in the field of IPRs and afore made 
analysis of other FTAs imply that it would not be in the benefit of India in 
the context of production and access to medicines to conclude IndEUFTA in 
the form proposed by the EU (i.e. having stringent IPRs going beyond 
TRIPS Agreement). In this sense, when the strict IPRs prove their obvious 
side effects to India’s ability of generic production and access to the 
medicines of millions dependant on that production, it will be up to the 
political will of India to resist such provisions. Of course one important 
issue to be underlined in relation to this is that, unlike other discussed 
developing countries that ratified FTAs, India has stronger political status 
and negotiation power which leaves a room for optimism.  
 
  
                                                             
206 El-Said H., supra note 186, p. 444. 
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6 Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The HIV pandemic has already demonstrated its horrifying picture and it 
does not seem to step back in the coming future. Therefore, the role of HIV 
medicines remains to be vital.  The HIV medicines are not medications 
against headache or stomachache, but they are medications which can mean 
life or death for the people affected or who may potentially be affected by 
the disease. Besides this material significance of HIV medicines, the 
accesses to such medicines can also be important from human rights 
perspective. As described before, there are certain bases to see access to, at 
least, essential medicines, which include ARVs, as a human right under the 
umbrella of the right to health. Therefore, an access to HIV medicines is 
undeniably important from both material and rights perspectives. It is true 
that HIV medicines cannot fully cure the contemporary plague of the world 
HIV, but, not less importantly, HIV medicines have so far engendered 
remarkable decrease in the newly infected people, have prolonged the lives 
of millions of people already infected with the disease and have been 
pushing the disease back from further escalation. Indian generic producers, 
in their turn, have been an instrumental player in accomplishing this task by 
providing with majority of low cost good quality generic version of ARVs 
worldwide. Taking into account this mutual importance of HIV medicines 
and Indian generic manufacturers, parties, especially the EU, of the 
IndEUFTA must make sure that this importance is not sacrificed for mere 
economic benefits. 
 On the other hand, one should acknowledge the benefits that 
IndEUFTA and IPRs in general may bring to the people. And it is not also 
the purpose of this thesis to claim that both IndEUFTA and IPRs must be 
totally avoided or else they may bring only detriments. It is also necessary 
to understand the rivalry position of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies towards generic production and their attempt to push forward 
stronger IPRs. The pharmaceutical companies invest considerable effort and 
money to come up with new drugs whereas generic companies can easily 
copy and produce those drugs for almost next to nothing. However, the case 
of particularly Indian generic manufacturers can be exceptional for, at least, 
two main reasons. First, as explained before, Indian generic manufacturers 
mainly target their products to local producers and to developing countries. 
Therefore, this does not bring much loss to original drug producers since the 
most of the consumers of Indian generics cannot anyway afford to buy the 
original product from its original producers. Second, generics manufactured 
in India may not bring some fatal consequences for multinational 
pharmaceutical companies whereas it might be so for human beings. Indian 
generics can at the best mean for original pharmaceutical companies some 
loss of the revenue. We can let the annual net income of original 
pharmaceutical companies to be, let’s say, USD 2 billion instead of 2.5 
billon for the expanse of millions of saved lives.    
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 The provisions of, especially, the IndEUFTA must be designed with 
special care considering all factors discussed in this thesis. The thesis does 
not limit itself with just encouragement of special care, but instead offers 
some modest recommendations. These recommendations are: 
 Any provisions of the IndEUFTA, including those discussed in this 
thesis, that have negative impact on access to affordable medicines, 
particularly HIV medicines for the purpose of this study, must be 
avoided; 
 In all negotiations and in the final draft of the IndEUFTA, public 
health must be prioritized and placed at the heart of decision making 
when the subject concerns IPRs and other regulations that may have 
an effect on access to medicines; 
 Considering the crucial importance of Indian generics in terms of 
access to medicines in both domestic and international level, Indian 
generic manufacturers must be left enough space to keep their 
production of low cost high quality generics; 
 Provisions of the IndEUFTA must not compromise India’s ability of 
using TRIPS flexibilities and similarly must not impede the currently 
used flexibilities in India; 
 The fact that IndEUFTA may hamper access to affordable HIV 
medicines and other lifesaving medicines not only to Indian local 
consumers but millions, mostly poor, leaving in other developing 
countries must be given due consideration; 
 Parties to the IndEUFTA must be aware that along with lives of 
millions, their human right to health might be also at stake and that 
certain provisions of the IndEUFTA might infringe this right. 
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